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Abstract 
Index funds trade for nonstrategic reasons because their clients’ personal liquidity needs 
primarily drive fund flows. These funds are thus unambiguously more likely than strategic 
traders to prefer high stock liquidity, and thus high disclosure, to reduce trading costs. I 
hypothesize that index funds’ ownership stakes give them power to elicit more disclosure from 
management. I use an index fund setting to construct an empirical model of voluntary disclosure, 
and find that when index funds join a firm due to its S&P 500 index inclusion, the size of their 
ownership stake is associated with an increase in disclosure, and this increase in disclosure is 
associated with higher stock liquidity (relative to a control firm). These results suggest that 
disclosure increases stock liquidity. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Stock liquidity – the sensitivity of stock price to order flow – is central to the efficient 
functioning of trade in the financial markets, and is in part determined by information asymmetry 
among traders in the market.  Since voluntary disclosure can affect information asymmetry among 
traders, theoretical accounting research has shown that voluntary disclosure can affect stock liquidity 
(e.g., Bushman and Indjejikian, 1995).  However, any empirical test of this mechanism must recognize 
that a manager’s provision of disclosure is a product of many forces, all of which must be identified.1  
It has proved difficult to construct an empirical model of disclosure that incorporates all these forces 
(e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Joos 2000).  This study therefore focuses on a specific class of 
traders, namely index funds, whose primary trading motive is for exogenous nonstrategic reasons, not 
strategic information reasons.  Theory suggests that such nonstrategic investors always prefer higher 
stock liquidity (a level playing field), and thus are unambiguously more likely to prefer a high 
disclosure regime relative to privately informed strategic investors.  This study constructs an empirical 
model of voluntary disclosure using an index fund setting to demonstrate that voluntary disclosure 
increases stock liquidity.  
An important feature of the index fund setting is that index funds are sold as a mutual fund 
portfolio or derivative security (e.g., exchange traded funds or ETFs) that tracks a specified index.  
Prior research suggests that client redemptions and purchases in index funds are typically not strategic 
(see Chapter 2.2 for details).  Investors in these funds thus unambiguously benefit from high stock 
liquidity in the underlying index stocks (Appendix 1 describes the ETF creation process in more 
detail).  The fund sponsors therefore have an unambiguous preference for liquidity-increasing 
disclosure in the index constituent firms.  
A second important feature of the index fund setting is that index constituent changes are 
exogenous to index funds when the index’s governing body (such as S&P) adds and drops firms to and 
from the index.  When a firm is added, index funds perforce take an ownership position in that firm, 
                                                 
1
 For example, as Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) note, strategic insiders have to consider the effects of disclosure on 
both their information advantage and the firm’s stock liquidity, because both factors affect their trading profits. 
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and this exogenous ownership position confers control rights.  Hence, when index funds, with an 
unambiguous demand for more disclosure (relative to strategic investors and management), acquire 
control rights through their ownership stake, any link between an increase in voluntary disclosure due 
to this control and stock liquidity can be construed as causal.2  By contrast, it is harder to make such 
claims for strategic investors (including management) without explicitly modeling their endogenous 
preferences for disclosure, liquidity, and ownership. 
I use S&P 500 index inclusion as the key economic phenomenon to test whether disclosure 
increases stock liquidity.  The ownership stakes of index funds are determined by their assets under 
management (AUM) at the time of a firm’s index inclusion: the larger the funds’ AUM, the larger the 
funds’ ownership stakes in index firms.3  As I detail in Chapter 2.2, neither these funds’ portfolio 
allocations nor their aggregate fund flows appear to be strategic.  I therefore conjecture that client 
purchases and redemptions in index funds and associated index ETFs are largely for personal 
consumption needs.  Index inclusions occur at several times and, because AUM changes throughout 
time, this setting generates variation in the percentage ownership stakes that index funds take in any 
newly included index firm.  I use this variation for identification in this setting, and also to account for 
any index inclusion effects common to all newly added index firms.  Index inclusions are exogenous to 
index fund sponsors because they cannot choose which firms are added to the index, and, upon 
inclusion, the index fund ownership stake is exogenous to the included firm’s management because 
they cannot influence index fund AUM. 
In addition, S&P can include only one firm for each deleted firm, which it does using public 
information.  Each inclusion firm can therefore be closely matched to a control firm using propensity 
scores.  Exploiting each inclusion firm’s behavior pre and post inclusion relative to the matched 
control firm results in a difference-in-difference (D-in-D) regression setting that eliminates time 
varying effects common to both firms, any inclusion effect common to all inclusion firms, and firm 
fixed effects. 
I use a sample of 368 S&P 500 index inclusion firms (and 368 control firms) over the period of 
1996-2010.  In my sample, 78% of index inclusions occur as a result of a merger or an acquisition of 
an existing index firm.  I identify index funds from their regulatory filings (see Chapter 3.3).  Index 
fund shareholdings occur exclusively in the inclusion firms (not the control firms), and for a one 
                                                 
2
 Index fund sponsors can get managers to disclose more in two ways: (1) index fund sponsors may explicitly demand 
more disclosure from managers, and/or (2) managers may be attuned to index fund sponsors’ preference for more 
disclosure and increase disclosure independently.  I describe these mechanisms and this revealed preference argument 
further in Chapters 2.3 and 2.4. 
3
 I commingle all index funds into one large fund, under the assumption that all index funds share the same liquidity 
preference. 
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standard deviation increase in index fund shareholdings, management guidance disclosures increase by 
19.35%, 8-K filings increase by 18.99%, supplementary financial statement filings increase by 9.49%, 
and press releases increase by 7.51% (relative to control firms).  These results suggest that index fund 
sponsors are more effective at eliciting disclosure when they have a larger stake in a firm.4  
Interestingly, the intercept terms in these regressions are insignificant, suggesting that index inclusion 
by itself is not the key economic event, rather it is the ownership change ensuing from inclusion that is 
the key underlying driver.  Additionally, if management is entrenched, I conjecture that index fund 
sponsors may be less effective in their goal of eliciting more disclosure.  I find that less entrenched 
managers provide more disclosure for the same amount of increase in index fund shareholdings.   
I next explicitly demonstrate the stock liquidity effect of the increase in disclosure related to 
index fund ownership.  I first show that stock liquidity, as proxied for by bid-ask spreads and the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, increases for inclusion firms relative to control firms in a D-in-D 
manner when the treatment firm, i.e., the firm joining the index, gets a larger ownership stake from 
index funds.  This increase in stock liquidity may be unrelated to the improved disclosure 
environment, but could occur simply because of increased uninformed trading resulting from index 
fund rebalancing needs.  I use a recursive structural model to separate the disclosure effect and the 
trading effect of index fund ownership on stock liquidity, and find that the disclosure effect is 
significant.5  Inclusion firms also experience an improvement in their information environment, as 
measured by analyst forecast errors. 
My study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, theory suggests that disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry and increases stock liquidity (e.g., Verrecchia 2001).  Like the present 
study, prior studies relating disclosure to liquidity corroborate this prediction by generally finding a 
positive relationship.  For example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) rely on the voluntary adoption of 
IFRS by German firms to represent a commitment to increased disclosure and find that voluntary 
adopters experience greater liquidity.  Similarly, Welker (1995) and Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) 
find that firms with more favorable analyst disclosure ratings have higher liquidity.  Shroff, Sun, 
White, and Zhang (2013) find that after the passing of the 2005 Securities Offering Reform, firms 
increased disclosure prior to seasoned equity offerings, leading to higher stock liquidity for these 
firms.  Balakrishnan et al. (2014) argue that increased disclosure associated with reductions to analyst 
coverage resulting from brokerage house closures can be interpreted as plausibly exogenous, and find 
                                                 
4
 In Chapter 4.3, I show that my main results cannot be attributed to the changing presence of non-index institutional 
investors.  
5
 I describe this model and its identifying assumptions in Chapter 4.1.1. 
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that managers who choose to provide more disclosure (a choice not explicitly modeled) increase their 
firm’s stock liquidity.6  However, all of these studies acknowledge identification challenges in 
modeling management’s reporting choices, because managers are strategic actors with respect to the 
stock price.  I differentiate my study from these by empirically modeling disclosure using an index 
fund setting for identification, and I show that the increase in disclosure associated with the exogenous 
ownership level of index funds, which unambiguously prefer more disclosure for stock liquidity 
purposes, increases stock liquidity. 
Second, prior studies such as Lang and Lundholm (1996), Healy et al. (1999), and Bushee and 
Noe (2000) show that disclosure is associated with institutional investor shareholdings.  These studies 
use these associations to argue that institutional investors are attracted to firms with certain disclosure 
practices, and that management may adopt disclosure practices to attract such investors.  However, 
these studies acknowledge the endogenous nature of institutional shareholdings: investors may 
strategically invest and divest based on their unobservable investing strategy, which may ultimately 
affect their demand for disclosure.7  Index funds, by contrast, have no such leeway in choosing their 
portfolio firms.  Using S&P 500 index inclusion as an exogenous shock, I show that index fund 
sponsors use disclosure as a mechanism to increase the stock liquidity of their portfolio firms.   
Third, studies such as Beneish and Whaley (1996) and Hegde and McDermott (2003) 
document that a firm’s S&P 500 index inclusion is followed by a reduction in bid-ask spreads.  These 
studies focus on the on average index inclusion effect for liquidity and conjecture, but do not test the 
idea that uninformed index fund trading contributes to these lower spreads.  Relatedly, Boone and 
White (2014) find that firms at the top of the Russell 2000 disclose more and have higher stock 
liquidity.  However, Boone and White (2014) do not test whether it’s disclosure that is causing the 
higher stock liquidity, or the nonstrategic index fund trading.8  In the current study, I not only consider 
the on average index inclusion effect for liquidity, but also the effect related to nonstrategic index fund 
trading, and, most importantly, the disclosure effect related to the additional disclosures that index 
fund sponsors elicit from index firms.  I find that following index inclusion, these three effects are all 
associated with increased stock liquidity.  My findings thus identify an important mechanism, 
disclosure, that index fund sponsors use to increase stock liquidity. 
Finally, this paper is one of the first to highlight the crucial role of one large class of 
                                                 
6
 Like Shroff, Sun, White, and Zhang (2013) and Balakrishnan et al. (2014), I also use management guidance and 
press releases as disclosure measures in this study. 
7
 For example, investors (including management) may prefer the release of good news before a large stock sale to 
raise prices, and the release of bad news before a large stock purchase to decrease prices. 
8
 I relate my results to these studies further in Chapter 4.3.  In Chapter 2.5, I discuss why I use the S&P 500 index 
setting in favor of the Russell indices. 
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nonstrategic traders, index funds, by exploiting their control rights.  The asset pricing literature has 
always viewed nonstrategic traders, or noise traders, as a necessary but incidental player in the pricing 
process (e.g., Kyle 1985).  However, as these traders become large, corporate finance considerations 
begin to intervene, because these traders acquire control rights through their ownership stake.  My 
focus on index funds and disclosure complements prior studies such as Brav et al. (2008), which show 
that other large owners such as hedge funds exercise their ownership power by explicit intervention in 
management’s business decisions.  Such interventions, which require the owner to acquire the 
necessary management skills, are not feasible for index funds, which aim to hold a large basket of 
stocks in many industries at low cost.  Nonetheless, as this study shows, index funds do find their 
ownership stake useful for their own purpose, and exploit it accordingly. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss my study’s motivation and hypotheses.  Chapter 3 and 4 describe my 
data and empirical results.  Chapter 5 concludes with this study’s contribution to the literature and 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
 
Chapter 2.1 Index fund industry and the importance of stock liquidity 
Index funds have grown dramatically in recent years and this industry is dominated by a few 
large firms with economies of scale in a highly competitive market (according to S&P’s website at 
current time, index fund holdings account for $1.6 trillion of the $14 trillion S&P 500 market 
capitalization, or 11.4%).  The index fund product has three attributes: (1) it tracks an index (Elton, 
Gruber, and Busse, 2004 find that index returns explain 99.9% of the variation in index fund returns); 
(2) the product has low expense ratios (e.g., BlackRock’s S&P 500 ETF and Vanguard’s S&P 500 
mutual fund have expense ratios of 0.07% and 0.05%, respectively); and (3) its liquidity allows clients 
to trade in and out at will (according to Vanguard’s website, the average bid-ask spread for Vanguard’s 
S&P 500 ETF in October, 2014 was 0.01% of the market price; the same average for BlackRock’s 
S&P 500 ETF was 0.02%). 
Since expense ratios and bid-ask spreads are close in magnitude, index funds can maintain 
their competitive position by reducing both of these costs.  Large index funds can avoid the impact of 
bid-ask spreads internally in two ways: by fulfilling orders in-house using excess shares of the 
underlying index firms held in inventory, and by netting trades whenever possible.  The former 
exposes the fund sponsor to inventory risk, namely price volatility in the excess shares held of a firm.  
Holding stock in inventory is also costly: because fractions of shares cannot be purchased on the open 
market, it takes a minimum of $3.6 million to hold an S&P 500 value-weighted portfolio as inventory 
(at current time).  Netting trades internally, on the other hand, requires serendipitous timing of trades 
and a significant investment in technology that can match purchases to redemptions and trades across 
7 
 
funds in real time.9  Ultimately, when there is a significant order imbalance, index funds will have to 
bear the external costs of trading the underlying index stocks in the open market (Appendix 1 
documents explicitly the ETF creation and redemption processes and how the fund sponsor engages in 
trade in the secondary markets).  Therefore, the liquidity of the index fund and all its associated 
vehicles depends on the liquidity of the underlying index stocks.  If the liquidity of the underlying 
stocks improves, index funds benefit greatly from lower trading costs for their clients, lower absolute 
tracking error, and higher AUM. 
A casual observer of the index fund industry may believe that expense ratios are the only 
concern for an index fund.  However, I argue that managing stock liquidity is just as important.  The 
main premise of this study is that index funds can improve stock liquidity in the underlying index 
stocks by using their ownership power to elicit more disclosure from management.  I next show that 
this premise is also consistent with theory. 
 
2.2 Index funds as nonstrategic noise traders 
Index funds’ relationship with liquidity is perhaps best understood by viewing them as 
nonstrategic noise traders.  Theoretically, nonstrategic noise traders are investors who trade not for 
private information reasons, but for personal consumption and liquidity needs.  Noise traders play an 
important role in asset pricing models such as Kyle (1985).  Their exogenous trading needs make them 
loss-absorbing counterparties to informed traders and price-protecting market makers.  As a result, 
noise traders unambiguously prefer mechanisms (such as disclosure) that improve stock liquidity and 
level the playing field with their informed counterparts.  This preference is in contrast to informed 
traders who have to reckon with both the income effect (size of the pie) and the substitution effect 
(share of the pie) of creating a level playing field.10  Modeling such preferences can be empirically 
                                                 
9
 BlackRock, for instance, notes in their 2013 10-K that they use a proprietary trading software platform called 
Aladdin for internal portfolio management and trade execution and as an advisory product they sell to other investors.  
The 10-K states, “Aladdin is our proprietary technology platform, which serves as the risk management system for 
both BlackRock and a growing number of sophisticated institutional investors around the world.”  Although 
BlackRock’s 10-K does not detail the costs required to maintain this trading system, it does note that in 2013 
BlackRock made $421 million in client advisory revenue from Aladdin (total revenue was $6.2 billion), attesting to 
the priority that BlackRock and its clients give to trade execution.  However, based on conversations with BlackRock 
independent trustees, the overwhelming majority of BlackRock’s trading in the underlying S&P 500 firms still occurs 
in the open secondary markets. 
10
 In the one-period Kyle model (1985, p. 1317), the information advantage outweighs the stock liquidity effect, 
suggesting that the exogenously informed investor wants less disclosure.  Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) construct a 
version of the Kyle model in which more disclosure reduces the insider’s information advantage but still increases his 
trading profits.  In Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), who combine trading with governance, improved stock liquidity 
increases information collection by traders, which increases both informed trading and governance effectiveness.  In a 
similar vein, management, typically also an informed investor, may prefer higher or lower liquidity and thus more or 
less disclosure, depending on the situation (e.g., insider share sales or takeover threats). 
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challenging.  On the other hand, the unambiguous noise trader preference for more disclosure and 
stock liquidity means that the link between noise-trader-induced disclosures and liquidity can be 
studied without empirically modeling these traders’ disclosure preferences.  
Establishing index funds as nonstrategic noise traders requires establishing that the changes in 
their ownership position occur for nonstrategic reasons, not strategic information reasons.  I therefore 
first discuss the factor that drives the variation in index fund ownership, namely index fund assets 
under management (AUM), and describe why this factor is an appropriate proxy for the theoretical 
construct of nonstrategic noise trading.   
Index fund AUM depends on client purchases and redemptions, which in turn cause index 
funds to trade so they can honor payouts and avoid maintaining excess cash reserves.  Given prior 
evidence that both retail and mutual fund flows are typically not strategic (Carhart 1997; Barber et al., 
2008; Frazzini and Lamont, 2008; Fama and French, 2010), I assume that index fund purchases and 
redemptions from such clients happen for nonstrategic (i.e., personal consumption or liquidity) 
reasons.  That is, if a client has specific private information about a given firm, he may wish to trade in 
that firm directly, not through the index.  In fact, even the largest firms in the index today (2015), such 
as Apple, constitute only about 3% of the index, so trading the index may not be the most effective 
way to speculate in one or a few of these firms.  The top firms in the index also span several sectors, 
suggesting that sector information may be more effectively exploited using a sector fund rather than 
the index.  Furthermore, large index funds have many clients and it is unlikely that a single client can 
make a significant difference to fund flows; it is also unlikely that all these clients are systematically 
informed in the same manner, a necessary criterion for such information to drive aggregate fund flows.  
Finally, if index fund flows represent general beliefs about macroeconomic conditions, there would 
have to be a strong reason that these beliefs pertain only to index firms and are associated with the 
timing of index inclusion events.  Arbitrage considerations dictate that if such beliefs drive the 
dependent variables in my empirical tests, they would also impact the matched control firms (which I 
show are closely related to the treatment firms), and would be eliminated in the differencing 
procedure.11  Of course, clients may trade their positions in the index to finance or rebalance their 
speculation in individual stocks, but that is the definition of nonstrategic trading.12  
Although most index funds do not legally guarantee perfect index tracking, Elton, Gruber, and 
Busse (2004) find that: (1) S&P 500 index fund returns trail the S&P 500 index on average by an 
                                                 
11
 I discuss the features of my D-in-D research design further in Chapter 4.1. 
12
 In stark contrast, many top hedge fund managers not only design their portfolios strategically, but also limit client 
activities such as redemptions and purchases (Lerner and Schoar, 2004). 
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amount close in magnitude to the average index fund expense ratio; and (2) a regression of index fund 
returns on index returns has an R2 of 0.999, providing additional evidence that index funds do not 
make strategic portfolio allocations.  Therefore, index fund ownership levels in a firm cannot be 
attributed to strategic asset allocation or stock picking by index funds.13 
 
2.3 Index funds’ demand for stock liquidity and disclosure  
To the extent that index fund sponsors trade for nonstrategic reasons, the fund sponsors benefit 
from liquidity in the index firms’ stocks, not only because it reduces trading costs for them and their 
clients, but also because it increases the liquidity of fund sponsors’ derivative securities such as ETFs 
(e.g., Madhavan and Sobczyk, 2014).  If the underlying stocks are illiquid, index funds may find it 
optimal to aggregate net redemption and purchases and trade only sporadically, a second-best strategy 
that balances trading costs with non-trading costs such as the risk of adverse price movements.  
Likewise, ETF managers have to ensure that there is adequate supply of ETF shares in the market so 
that ETF prices do not deviate from the underlying index.  As the effective “market maker” in their 
own ETFs (for net ETF demand not fulfilled by secondary market counterparties), more liquidity also 
allows fund sponsors to hold less inventory of the ETF, i.e., they can trade the underlying stocks as 
needed to meet net ETF demand (see Appendix 1).  Liquidity thus reduces the cost of making the 
market at the fundamental index price.  As noted in Chapter 1, theory suggests that such investors who 
unambiguously benefit from increased liquidity also have a stronger demand for more disclosure 
compared to other strategic traders, because high disclosure and the ensuing liquidity reduces their 
trading costs, and, in the case of index funds, also reduces tracking error and increases AUM.   
By contrast, informed strategic investors have to consider the effects of disclosure on both their 
information advantage and the firm’s stock liquidity, because both factors affect their trading profits.  
Likewise, management may gain private benefits from withholding disclosure (e.g., Nagar 1999).  
Small, atomistic retail investors, however, have no power to affect a firm’s disclosure practices.  I 
therefore assume that index funds’ demand for disclosure exceeds the level optimal for other investors 
and management (I test this assumption further through comparative statics tests).  
The above disclosure argument applies to a single firm, not a portfolio of firms.  An owner of a 
firm may want disclosure that reduces firm value by leaking proprietary information, if the recipient of 
that disclosure is another firm in the owner’s portfolio.  However, if this information leakage is 
                                                 
13
 Some actively managed mutual funds track or hug an index in an attempt to beat it.  My coding procedure for index 
funds in Chapter 3.3 does not consider such firms as index funds.  I also do not consider enhanced and levered ETFs 
as index funds in my sample. 
10 
 
inefficient – the losing firm loses more than the gaining firm – a value-weighted portfolio such as an 
index will never benefit from such disclosure transfers.  I therefore do not consider the possibility of 
over-disclosures for some firms in a portfolio, and instead conduct my disclosure analyses at the firm 
level rather than the portfolio level.  
I next discuss how index funds can act on their preference for more disclosure and liquidity.  
 
2.4 Index funds’ control through ownership 
Upon a firm’s index inclusion, I assume that (1) management begins to provide more 
disclosure immediately because they are aware of index fund sponsors’ preference for more disclosure, 
and/or (2) index fund sponsors communicate their preference for more disclosure to management 
immediately in order to begin realizing the benefits from increased liquidity.  I rely primarily on the 
index fund ownership stake to measure the fund sponsors’ power over management.14   
For (1), it’s likely that managers are attuned to index fund sponsors’ preference for more 
disclosure, because index funds state their preference for more disclosure on their websites, and/or 
managers observe the reporting practices of their index peers.  For (2), index funds have to recognize 
the current level of disclosure and articulate their preference for more disclosure.  Importantly, index 
funds have to do this task in a cost-effective manner to keep costs low.  Large index funds such as 
BlackRock, Fidelity, and Vanguard have a significant cost advantage in this respect because they can 
retain a small team of analysts and investor relations personnel who can check disclosure levels across 
the industry by examining media and financial reports, management disclosures and guidance 
activities of peer firms, earnings conference calls, and other information venues such as investor 
conferences and private meetings with management, and calibrate an appropriate disclosure level for 
index companies.15  Appendix 2 provides institutional evidence of these activities.  
A significant obstacle facing index fund sponsors in their goal to improve disclosure is that 
other large strategic investors and managers may want a lower level of disclosure, and therefore 
managers may balk at their requests.  To overcome this obstacle, index fund sponsors rely on both hard 
and soft power.  The main source of hard power for index fund sponsors arises from their ownership 
                                                 
14
 I consider index fund ownership to be the primary motive for control as opposed to a firm’s index weighting 
because index funds must consistently rebalance all stocks in their portfolios (when AUM changes).    
15
 Such analysts may benefit all index funds, but my assumption is that they are a net benefit to their employer, 
especially if the employer is a large index fund sponsor.  In addition, hiring analysts to calibrate disclosure levels is 
arguably less expensive than acquiring the expertise required to persuade management of portfolio firms to pursue 
certain strategies, if necessary. 
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stake, which confers explicit control rights such as proxy votes (Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2010).16  Soft 
power over management, on the other hand, comes from a variety of sources including managements’ 
and directors’ concerns about their reputation and credibility (e.g., Levit 2013).17  Index fund sponsors 
such as BlackRock and Vanguard, by virtue of their size, also have considerable soft influence in the 
director market due to social networks and other connections (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 
2008).18  This soft power appears to be quite salient in these settings (see review by Edmans 2014). 
Although index fund sponsors have power over management, this power is not unlimited, and 
index fund sponsors have to exert costly effort to induce disclosure from management.  To keep their 
costs low, index fund sponsors must strategically choose where to exert this effort.  Theory suggests 
that an index fund’s optimum allocation of resources will be such that the marginal returns on the last 
dollar of each disclosure-inducing project will be equal.  I cannot directly measure such internal 
marginal returns; I therefore conjecture that index fund ownership will play an important role in this 
process, given the control rights conferred by such ownership.19  I additionally expect that entrenched 
management teams will be less responsive to index fund sponsors’ demands.20  Finally, I assume that 
index fund sponsors are homogenous in their preference for more disclosure, and commingle all index 
funds into a single ownership measure.   
 
2.5 The ownership exogeneity of the S&P 500 inclusion setting 
                                                 
16
 Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010)’s Table 1 shows that Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund withheld votes for 
management 17.2% of the time from July 2003 to June 2004.  They also document that fund sponsors wrote comment 
letters to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003 about the new law requiring mutual funds to 
publicly disclose their proxy votes.  Fund sponsors feared managements would deny private communication access to 
any sponsor who withheld their votes for management.  I discuss the role that index fund sponsors and their analysts 
play in eliciting more disclosure along with index fund sponsors’ disclosure preferences in Appendix 2. 
17
 For example, if management refuses to disclose more after a face to face meeting or phone call with an index fund 
sponsor, the index fund sponsor could communicate to other large shareholders that management is not credible.  
These shareholders could in turn sell their stock, signaling to the market that management lacks credibility, or take 
actions to remove management.  Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) and McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2011)’s survey 
paper provide empirical evidence consistent with information sharing between large mutual fund sponsors. 
18
 Zwiebel (1995) uses a coalition argument to show analytically that even a diffuse shareholder base can confer 
substantial control through coordination.  This is an especially salient finding in this context because the SEC permits 
shareholders to coordinate their monitoring activities.  Such coordination can occur between fund sponsors through, 
for example, the use of proxy advisory firms such as ISS and Glass Lewis (e.g., Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch, 2013; 
Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal, 2013), and through direct communication and information sharing, which can be 
facilitated by groups such as the Shareholder-Director Exchange (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2005). 
19
 I acknowledge that any benefits resulting from an action taken by a large shareholder accrue to all shareholders.  I 
therefore assume that the benefits of such actions outweigh the costs to the large shareholder (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986).  I have already argued in Chapter 2.3 that index funds are likely to investigate disclosure choices of 
index firms individually rather than from a portfolio perspective.  The matched control firm then measures the optimal 
level of disclosure in the absence of index sponsors. 
20
 I cannot discount the possibility that entrenched managers maintain their entrenchment status by gaining the favor 
of some large investors through disclosure activities.  If this possibility is indeed the empirical reality, I should find no 
comparative static results for index fund entry into firms with entrenched managers. 
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In most situations, exogenous shocks are hard to find.  But the index fund setting has a natural 
shock: inclusion in the S&P 500 index.21  S&P’s decision to include a firm in the index is always 
paired with an index deletion, and these deletions are most often caused by the acquisition of an index 
firm.  In my sample, 78 percent of index inclusions occur as a result of such index deletions.22  To 
maintain 500 index constituents, S&P announces index additions and deletions concurrently, and the 
newly added firm officially becomes part of the index within five business days of the 
announcement.23  This inclusion is exogenous from the index fund sponsor perspective because index 
fund sponsors cannot influence S&P’s decisions.   
From the manager’s perspective, index addition causes index funds to buy out a significant 
share of their firm’s existing owners.  The resulting index fund ownership level in a firm is exogenous 
because the ownership stake is determined by index fund AUM.  Note that firm value and size have no 
impact on the index fund ownership level at the time of inclusion: if the value of an index firm is large, 
its weight in the index will also be large.  Hence the only reason that index fund ownership in a newly 
included index firm changes is due to inflows and outflows into AUM.24  The manager can still exert 
effort (including disclosure) to increase the chances of his firm getting into the index, but he cannot 
control index fund AUM, and thus the index fund ownership stake in his firm.  Likewise, the manager 
of an individual firm cannot control the timing of events that cause deletions and additions.25  
Consequently, the variation in index fund AUM across time drives the variation in the ownership stake 
of index funds when a firm enters the index (note that limiting the sample to the inclusion events 
understates the true variation in AUM, which could vary daily due to liquidity shocks).  To the extent 
that the variation in AUM across time is unrelated to an individual firm’s activities, it is unlikely that 
managerial propensity to disclose drives the index fund ownership stake upon inclusion. 
 
                                                 
21
 I recognize that other investors may endogenously join or exit a firm around such index events.  I show 
econometrically in Chapter 4.3 that this does not affect my main results.  I use the S&P 500 index because newly 
included firms vary widely in size, it’s unlikely that management knows whether or when their firm will be included 
(Chen et al., 2004), and firms often stay in the index for extended periods of time, encouraging index fund sponsors 
and management teams to develop working relationships.  By contrast, indexes such as the Russell 1000 are based on 
market capitalization, thus providing a clearer “target” for managers to aim for to gain inclusion, and resulting in high 
index churn only at relatively low levels of market capitalization (Mullins 2014). 
22
 I discuss index deletions as an exogenous shock to index fund ownership in greater detail in Chapter 4.6. 
23
 At current time (2014), the S&P 500 consists of 502 stocks because of S&P’s decision to include in the index a 
second class of stock for Discovery Communication and Google in connection with their stock dividends.  The 
number of companies in the index, however, still stands at 500. 
24
 For example, assume that each index firm has the same number of share-units outstanding.  Because the S&P 500 
index is value-weighted, an index fund at any given point in time will hold exactly the same number of share-units of 
all index firms.  This number depends on index fund AUM. 
25
 Recall that: (1) newly announced acquisitions of index firms cause 78% of index deletions and additions in my 
sample; and (2) index additions and deletions are announced concurrently and go into effect within five business days. 
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2.6 S&P 500 inclusion setting and matched control firm 
 The S&P 500 index inclusion setting has another key advantage in that only one firm can be 
selected into the index when an index firm is dropped.  Because S&P states that it uses public data to 
select the index entrant, I can use propensity score matching to locate a control firm which plausibly 
could have also been selected as an index entrant but was not.26  This matched control firm and the 
pre-treatment period provide two separate baselines for the post-treatment behavior of the treatment 
firm. 
  
2.7 Hypotheses  
To summarize, my main prediction is that index fund sponsors uniformly and unambiguously 
demand more public disclosure than informed shareholders and management.  To test this theory, I 
assume that competitive pressures drive the firm’s disclosure level to a second-best equilibrium that 
trades off managers’ and investors’ preferences and other effects such as proprietary costs.  I then 
locate an exogenous shock – S&P 500 index inclusion – that causes index funds to assume ownership.  
Disclosure then moves to a new second-best level, and I can then compare the difference in the 
disclosure levels.  However, the difference in the disclosure level can vary across inclusions because, 
for example, of shifting disclosure practices in the inclusion firm’s industry.  As stated in the previous 
chapter, I therefore set as a baseline the change in disclosure of a comparable firm that did not 
experience the exogenous shock (I locate the matched control firm using the same criteria as S&P does 
to identify index firms).  This results in difference-in-difference or D-in-D estimation.   
The advantage of using D-in-D estimation in an exogenous shock setting is that one does not 
need an explicit model of disclosure and index fund ownership.  To the extent that other drivers of 
disclosure such as proprietary costs change in the same manner across the treatment and control firm 
(e.g., time varying effects), or are constant (e.g., firm fixed effects), the D-in-D approach eliminates 
these factors from the analysis (Ch. 5, Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002; Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan, 2004).  Any remaining idiosyncratic changes form the error terms in my regressions.  
More importantly, I can isolate any systematic index inclusion effect on disclosure from the 
index fund ownership effect on disclosure: the inclusion effect is the intercept, and the index fund 
ownership effect is the coefficient on the index fund ownership stake.  The above considerations lead 
to my first hypothesis: 
                                                 
26
 S&P bases its inclusion decision on the public information criteria listed on their website 
(http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500).  I acknowledge that if S&P uses additional criteria not mentioned on 
their webpage, the matching specification will not include these potentially important dimensions.  I describe the 
matching process further in Chapter 3.1. 
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H1: When firms are included into the S&P 500 index, they increase disclosure more when they are 
more heavily owned by index funds, relative to matched control firms.   
 
Hypothesis H1 rests on the assumption that management (and other strategic investors) prefers 
a lower level of disclosure than index funds.  While ownership grants index funds power over 
management, I test this assumption further by checking whether the effect is mitigated when 
management has more power to resist owners’ demands.  Specifically, I test: 
  
H2: The results for H1 are stronger for firms whose managers are less entrenched. 
 
For H1 and H2, I assume that management and other large investors, who have incentives to 
gather firm-specific information privately and act on it either by intervention or by trading, 
systematically want less public disclosure than index fund sponsors.   
I next test whether disclosure impacts the stock liquidity of the firm in the capital markets, as 
proxied for by bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.27  I need to test this 
hypothesis explicitly for two reasons: first, it economically validates my disclosure measures; second, 
it has been theoretically shown that in some settings, disclosure can exacerbate information asymmetry 
by improving the information advantage of some investors over others (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994).  
Disclosure has also been shown to kill the market by eliminating risk-sharing trades (Hirshleifer 1971).  
It is important to demonstrate that such outcomes are not occurring in my setting.  Additionally, a 
concurrent liquidity effect in my setting is that the increase in uninformed trading resulting from index 
fund rebalancing needs will also affect a firm’s stock liquidity.  I therefore expect there to be a 
separate effect on stock liquidity due to disclosure alone.  Accordingly, I predict: 
 
H3: When firms are included into the S&P 500 index, their bid-ask spreads and Amihud illiquidity 
decrease more when they are more heavily owned by index funds, relative to matched control firms.  
Both index fund ownership and the additional disclosure associated with this ownership contribute to 
these decreases. 
 
  
                                                 
27
 A superior information environment should reduce bid-ask spreads (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). 
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Chapter 3 
Data 
 
3.1 Sample Selection: Treatment and Control Firms 
I create my S&P 500 index inclusion (treatment) sample by starting with all first time S&P 500 
additions from 1996-2010.  This time period coincides with the availability of disclosure data from the 
SEC.  The total number of inclusions is 433.  Following Denis et al. (2003), I manually eliminate 
observations for firms added to the index due to a large acquisition or spinoffs.  This process 
eliminates 45 inclusions.  I also require that each treatment firm remain in the index for at least two 
years after inclusion and be publicly traded for at least two years prior to index inclusion.  I choose the 
two year window because it gives the index fund sponsors time to establish relationships with 
management and management time to adjust their disclosures.  I use the [-2 years, 0) window as the 
pre-inclusion period and the [0, +2 years] window as the post-inclusion period, where 0 is the date that 
the firm was added to the S&P 500 index.28  Imposing this requirement eliminates 20 more inclusion 
firms.  Given the small number of eliminated firms, I assume that the survivorship or look-ahead bias 
is minimal.  The final sample comprises of 368 S&P 500 index inclusion firms.   
S&P can include only one firm to replace a firm that exits the index, and it does so using a list 
of publicly available information that it provides on its website.  This situation suggests that a good 
control firm can be found for the inclusion firm.  I therefore pair each S&P 500 inclusion firm with a 
control firm using a propensity score specification motivated by S&P’s index inclusion criteria.  I 
create the pool of potential control firms by starting with all Compustat firm-year observations for U.S 
companies, including my 368 treatment firms.  I eliminate firms that have been in the S&P 500 index 
during the entire time period of this study (1996-2010) and all observations for my treatment firms 
other than their [-2 year, +2 year] first time inclusion period.  I eliminate observations for non-
treatment firms that were not publicly traded during the entire [-2 year, +2 year] window around their 
year of observation in Compustat.  I then remove non-treatment firms that were in the S&P 500 index 
at any point during the [-2 year, +2 year] period around their specific year of observation in 
Compustat, and I eliminate observations for firms that meet all of the above requirements but were in 
                                                 
28
 Bertrand et al. (2004) recommend this “collapsed” pre and post period design for D-in-D settings.   
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the S&P 500 index at some point in time prior to their specific year of observation in Compustat.  This 
process yields a pool of 87,075 potential matches.  Using these observations I estimate a logit model 
with inclusion firm as the dependent variable and firm observables as independent variables (see Table 
1).29  Table 1 indicates that the propensity score model is reasonably accurate (adjusted McFadden’s 
pseudo-R2 of 0.301), reducing the likelihood of matching on correlated omitted variables.  Each 
treatment firm is matched with one control firm after sorting by year, Fama-French 12 industry, and 
propensity score, using nearest neighbor matching without replacement.  The purpose of this is to find 
a baseline control firm that is a reasonable substitute for the inclusion firm.   
Table 2, Panel A compares descriptive statistics averaged over the [-2, +2] year window for the 
treatment and control samples.  Treatment and matched control firms are similar on all dimensions 
except for market to book, analyst following, and log of firm age.  The differences in market to book 
and analyst following reconcile with prior studies that find that firm value increases for firms added to 
the index and analyst following increases with institutional holdings (e.g., O’Brien and Bhushan, 1999; 
Morck and Yang, 2001).  More important, disclosure levels for the treatment and control firms over 
the [-2 years, 0) relative to the treatment firm’s inclusion date are not significantly different at the 10% 
level.  Market adjusted abnormal returns for the treatment and control firms in the two-year post-
periods are highly correlated (0.87; 1% level), and their difference is statistically insignificant at the 
10% level.  This covariate balance helps validate the selection of control firms. 
 
3.2 Disclosure Measures  
I measure disclosure using management guidance and three categorizations of 8-K filings: the 
total number of filings, the number of filings containing “financial statements and exhibits” or “results 
of operations and financial condition”, and the number of filings containing a press release.30  Prior 
studies such as Carter and Soo (1999) and Lerman and Livnat (2010) show that 8-Ks contribute to the 
price formation process.31  However, it is not necessary that these disclosures be informative when 
they are filed with the SEC to test my hypotheses.  It may be the case that index fund sponsors solicit 
disclosures through other channels (e.g., requesting that a CEO participate more in earnings conference 
                                                 
29
 Recall that I choose independent variables for this regression based on the S&P 500 index eligibility criteria 
(http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500).  These variables include size factors, market capitalization, ROA, 
capital expenditures, research and development, intangibles, debt, an indicator that equals 1 if the firm pays a 
dividend, stock liquidity factors, as well as other selected firm attributes.  S&P specifically remarks that its index 
inclusion and deletion decisions do not reflect any private belief or opinion about the firm. 
30
 The SEC describes the 8-K filing as a “current report” which contains material information (outside of quarterly and 
annual financial statement filings) that management believes shareholders “should know about.” 
(http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm) 
31
 I discuss the informativeness of 8-Ks further in Chapter 4.3. 
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calls) that wind up getting captured in subsequent 8-K filings.  In such cases, 8-K filings still capture 
pertinent disclosures, albeit in a delayed manner.  As long as I have a measure that captures changes in 
disclosure, I can test my hypotheses.  
I use the Thomson Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) database to identify management 
guidance and WRDS’s SEC Analytics Suite to identify 8-K disclosures and their categorizations.32  
Each SEC filing is matched to the inclusion and control firms using their CIK identifier and date.  For 
each firm’s pre and post observation window, I aggregate the number of quarters in which 
management provides guidance and the total number of 8-K related filings and press releases.  
 
3.3 Measures of Index Fund Shareholdings 
Because I assume that all index funds are homogenous in their disclosure preferences, I 
aggregate all S&P 500 index funds into one fund, and measure the percentage of a firm’s shares 
outstanding held by these index funds in the first quarter after index inclusion using the Thomson-
Reuters Mutual Fund Database.33  Note that this ownership category includes index fund sponsors’ 
ETF ownership stake.  
I obtain holdings data for non-index institutional investor ownership using the Thomson-
Reuters 13F Database.34  Similar to the S&P 500 index fund case, I aggregate all non-indexers into one 
group and measure the ownership of this group in a given firm in terms of the funds’ ownership stake.  
Note that this category includes ownership stakes of index fund sponsors’ non-index funds. 
I next validate my index fund ownership measures.  First, I check that index fund ownership is 
limited to inclusion firms, not control firms, and find that this is indeed the case: index fund ownership 
is zero for control firms.  I next show in Figure 2 that the change in index fund ownership in a firm has 
the expected mechanical properties (based on index fund AUM).  Figure 2 indicates that the change in 
index fund ownership varies with index fund AUM.  This variation is expected because when index 
funds collectively have more AUM, they buy a greater percentage of each index constituent’s 
                                                 
32
 As a robustness check to First Call, I use I/B/E/S guidance from 2002-2012 to complement First Call and I also 
parse 8-K filings using Perl to identify guidance; using these alternative measures do not substantively change any 
results. 
33
 I manually identify index funds based on the fund’s name (e.g., State Street SPDR S&P 500 ETF).  I recognize that 
sometimes funds may buy options, but I expect this effect to be immaterial given the small size of the options market.  
Recall from Chapter 2.3 that I aggregate ownership because these investors have similar disclosure preferences.  I 
cross-check index fund holdings data from Thomson with two sources: Morningstar and aggregate S&P 500 index 
fund data from the Investment Company Institute (ICI).  The recent innovation of “Enhanced” S&P 500 index funds 
enters into the non-index fund variables because these funds do not strictly adhere to index weights in their portfolios. 
34
 This class of investors is comprised of institutions that have over $100 million in AUM.  I remove S&P 500 index 
funds from these institutions in this calculation.  
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outstanding shares.35  Finally, note that limiting the sample to the inclusion events understates the true 
variation in AUM, which could vary daily due to client liquidity shocks. 
 
3.4 Stock Liquidity and Information Environment Measures 
 I measure stock liquidity using the daily percent quoted spread from TAQ and the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure.  Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) find that the daily TAQ spread and 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure are the first and second best measures of stock liquidity, 
respectively.  For percent spreads, I follow Craig and Holden (2014)’s interpolated time method, 
which adjusts for withdrawn, crossed, and locked quotes.  I also follow Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2001) and remove trades out of sequence, trades recorded before or after the close, 
and trades with special settlement conditions.  Finally, I follow Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) and 
eliminate observations when any of the following criteria are met: quoted bid-ask spread is greater 
than $5, effective spread/quoted bid-ask spread is greater than 4.0, and quoted bid-ask 
spread/transaction price is greater than 0.4.    
Using all offers, I measure the daily average bid-ask spread as follows: 
 SPREADid =
100
nid
∑
(Askidk − Bididk)
Midk
n
k=1
 (1) 
Where n is the total number of offers for firm i on day d, Askidk is the ask price of firm i’s 
stock for a given offer k on day d, Bididk is the bid price of firm i’s stock for a given offer k on day d, 
and Midk is the mean of Askidk and Bididk.  I multiply this variable by 100 and compute separate 
spread values for the inclusion firm’s pre-inclusion period of [-2, 0) years and post-inclusion period of 
[0, +2] years, where time 0 is the firm’s index inclusion date, by taking the average SPREADid value 
over all trading days within each respective observation period.  I also compute this measure for the 
control firm.  I create the bid-ask spread D-in-D variable in two steps: (1) I subtract the inclusion 
firm’s pre-inclusion average spread from its post-inclusion average spread, and (2) I subtract from (1) 
the control firm’s post-inclusion average spread minus its pre-inclusion average spread.  This approach 
is similar to the one used in Bushee, Core, Guay, and Hamm (2010).  
I measure the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure using the daily ratio of the absolute value of 
stock returns to dollar trading volume: 
                                                 
35
 The ten index fund sponsors that most frequently take a stake in my treatment firms during the two years after their 
S&P 500 inclusion from 1996-2010 are Barclays, BlackRock Advisors, Fidelity, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
Smith Barney, State Street Fund Managers, T. Rowe Price, UBS, and Vanguard.  
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 AMIHUDid = 10
8 ×
|RETid|
VOLUMEid
 (2) 
Where RETid and VOLUMEid are daily returns and daily dollar trading volume, respectively, 
for firm i on day d.  I compute separate Amihud illiquidity values for the inclusion firm’s pre-inclusion 
period of [-2, 0) years and post-inclusion period of [0, +2] years, where time 0 is the firm’s index 
inclusion date, by taking the average AMIHUDid value over all trading days within each respective 
observation period.  I also compute this measure for the control firm.  I create the Amihud illiquidity 
D-in-D variable in two steps: (1) I subtract the inclusion firm’s pre-inclusion average illiquidity 
measure from its post-inclusion average, and (2) I subtract from (1) the control firm’s post-inclusion 
average illiquidity measure minus its pre-inclusion average. 
My proxy for a firm’s information environment is analyst earnings forecast errors, computed 
using the I/B/E/S detail file.  I create a daily mean analyst earnings forecast consensus file using 
quarterly EPS forecasts and take the mean consensus forecast two trading days before the earnings 
announcement date for the quarter being measured.  I follow prior studies such as Lys and Sohn 
(1990), and Hope (2003a, 2003b) and calculate quarterly percent analyst earnings forecast errors as 
follows, scaling by firm i’s stock price at the end of the quarter q: 
 AFEiq = |
(Actual EPSiq − Consensus Mean Analyst EPS Forecastiq)
Stock Priceiq
| (3) 
I compute separate analyst forecast error values for the inclusion firm’s pre-inclusion period of 
[-2, 0) years and post-inclusion period of [0, +2] years, where time 0 is the firm’s index inclusion date, 
by taking the average AFEiq value for all quarters within the respective observation period.  I also 
compute this measure for the control firm.  I then create the analyst forecast error D-in-D variable in 
two steps: (1) I subtract the inclusion firm’s pre-inclusion average forecast error from its post-
inclusion average forecast error, and (2) I subtract from (1) the control firm’s post-inclusion average 
forecast error minus its pre-inclusion average forecast error.  Table 2, Panel C provides descriptive 
statistics for the bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity measure, and forecast error variable. 
 
3.5 Control Variables 
In my D-in-D analysis I consider time varying covariates that may affect disclosure and 
liquidity.  I describe these covariates in detail in Appendix 3. 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Regression Specification 
My main equations for the treatment firms in the levels specification are as follows (I have the 
same set of equations for the controls firms, but I do not list them for brevity):  
 
DISCF,T  = α1INDF,T +  α2OTHF,T + ∑ αiCONTROLF,T + ε̃F,T + η̃F + γ̃FC,T (4) 
 
 
LIQF,T  = β1INDF,T + β2DISCF,T + β3OTHF,T + ∑ βiCONTROLF,T + ν̃F,T + κ1η̃F + κ2γ̃FC,T 
 
 
(5) 
 
The dependent variable DISC stands for the disclosure proxies, and the dependent variable 
LIQ stands for the stock liquidity proxies, namely bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure.  The independent variable IND stands for index fund percentage ownership, and OTH stands 
for other institutional percentage ownership.  The index F stands for the treatment firm, the index C 
stands the control firm, and index T stands the time period, where T = 0 is the two year pre-inclusion 
period, and T = 1 is the two-year post-inclusion period (relative to the treatment firm’s index inclusion 
date).  The assumptions are that firm-specific effects (η̃F) are fixed across time and that time-varying 
effects (γ̃FC,T) change in the same manner across time for the treatment and its control firm (but these 
terms can vary across the treatment-control pairs).  I also assume that the error terms, ε̃ and ν̃, are 
uncorrelated.36  As a result, their differences across time are also uncorrelated. 
I estimate the levels models (4) and (5) by using a difference-in-difference (D-in-D) design 
that cancels all the fixed-effects.  In particular, the firm fixed and time-varying effects control for an 
extensive set of endogeneity issues.  For example, consider the concern that management uses 
disclosure to get included into the index.  Recall that index inclusions are typically finalized within just 
five days after an index firm gets deleted, and deletions are typically unpredictable (e.g., Chen et al., 
2004).  This inclusion sequence thus occurs quickly and unexpectedly, making it unlikely that 
                                                 
36
 Because equations (4) and (5) share the same controls, I cannot use a control as an exclusion restriction.  I must use 
the independence of error terms for identification. 
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management could gain a coveted spot in the index by significantly altering disclosure practices.37  
Nonetheless, even if S&P chooses more forthcoming firms for the index, it’s reasonable to assume that 
this attribute is a firm fixed-effect that would be eliminated in the differencing procedure.  To the 
extent that both the inclusion and control firms take similar actions to try to get included into the 
index, then the differencing procedure will control for this effect as well.  Further, any systematic 
disclosure “inclusion effect” will form the intercept terms in my D-in-D regressions. 
 Once included in the index, another concern is that the index firms wish to have more index 
fund ownership and use disclosure to achieve their goal.  Recall that the only way for managers to get 
a larger index fund ownership stake in their firm is to increase index fund AUM; managers’ disclosure 
efforts must therefore attract new fund inflows.  These new inflows would show up as a change in 
index fund ownership from the beginning to the end of the inclusion period for the treatment firms.  I 
address this concern in two ways: (1) I use as my main regressor the index fund ownership stake in the 
first quarter after index inclusion rather than the average index fund ownership stake over the entire 
post period, and (2) I check for and do not find a statistically significant (at the 10% two-tailed level) 
on average change in index fund ownership from the beginning to the end of the post period for the 
treatment firms.  These findings suggest that my results are not attributable to management influence 
over index fund AUM. 
Another post index inclusion consequence could be that index inclusion leads non-index 
institutional investors who might prefer or influence certain disclosure decisions to invest in the newly 
included firm.  Although I control for the change in this class of investors, a correlated omitted 
variable bias could exist if the change in non-index investors is correlated with the error term and the 
change in index fund holdings in my regressions.38  However, such a bias in the non-index fund 
estimate would not pose a problem to the index fund estimate if the residualized non-index and index 
fund variables are uncorrelated (assuming no measurement error), as the non-index ownership bias 
would not be transmitted to the uncorrelated index fund ownership variable.  I therefore check for but 
do not find a statistically significant correlation between the residualized index fund and non-index 
fund variables.  This finding suggests that my results are not attributable to the changing presence of 
                                                 
37
 For example, the decision to provide earnings guidance is a complicated one that requires input from executives, the 
board, and lower level employees, and has many capital markets and reputational consequences (e.g., Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Kothari 2001). 
38
 This statement holds only if the change in non-index fund investors affects just the treatment firm.  Any common 
change to non-index investors that affects both the treatment and control firm will not induce a bias, as this change 
will be eliminated in the D-in-D procedure.  Unlike the change in index fund ownership, the change in non-index fund 
ownership is difficult to explicitly model, so I elect to use the change as a control.  Accordingly, in the results chapter 
I do not attempt to interpret the coefficient on the non-index fund variable. 
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other institutional investors.39 
Despite taking the above measures to address endogeneity concerns, I acknowledge one 
important weakness in my research design: any unobserved on average change to just index inclusion 
firms that is correlated with index fund ownership and not captured by the control firm time-varying 
effect or by any of the time-varying control variables will render a misspecified model.  However, if 
such an on average change is systematic across all index inclusion firms or uncorrelated with index 
fund ownership, then this change will form the intercept or error terms in my regressions, respectively.  
The possibility of having such a correlated latent factor is a limitation of all D-in-D research designs. 
 
4.1.1 Testing the Effect of Disclosure on Stock Liquidity 
I test H3, which predicts that disclosures elicited by index fund sponsors should increase stock 
liquidity, using bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to proxy for stock liquidity.  
However, stock liquidity can be influenced not just by disclosure activities, but also by increased 
uninformed trading resulting from index fund rebalancing.  The levels regressions (4) and (5) 
demonstrate the challenges of isolating the effect of disclosure on stock liquidity.  In particular, if 
stock liquidity decreases for some exogenous reason, management may increase disclosure to restore 
liquidity.  This effect is represented in equations (4) and (5) by the common fixed-effect terms η̃F and 
κ1η̃F and the common time-varying terms γ̃FC,T and κ2γ̃FC,T, where κ1 and κ2 are constants. 
To identify the direct and indirect effects of index ownership on stock liquidity, I conduct a 
recursive simultaneous equations model (p. 397, Greene 2002; Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and 
Schipper, 2012; Core, Hail, and Verdi, 2014).  I first create a summary D-in-D disclosure factor 
variable based on the pre-period to post-period D-in-D percentage changes in management guidance, 
8-K filings, supplementary financial statements, and press releases (these measures are described in 
Appendix 4 and Table 2, Panel C), with the motivation being that these disclosure measures represent 
an underlying disclosure model.  This intuition is supported by the positive correlations between the 
disclosure measures (Table 2, Panel D).  The factor process yields a one-dimensional disclosure 
variable, which considerably simplifies the structural equation model.40 
I next eliminate the endogeneity effects represented by the terms η̃F and κ1η̃F, and the terms 
                                                 
39
 As robustness checks, I re-run all tests using the following alternative specifications: (1) removing the control firm 
as a baseline, (2) removing the control firm as a baseline and using its respective dependent variable change as an 
independent variable, and (3) including a time trend.  Test (1) checks for whether my results are attributable to 
systematic changes to just the paired control firms.  Test (2) is a D-in-D estimation procedure that controls for fixed 
effects and time-varying factors common to both the treatment and control firm (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2004).  
These tests all produce results similar to my main results. 
40
 I explain the empirical procedure I use to create this variable and the associated factor weightings in Chapter 4.5. 
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γ̃FC,T=0,1 and κ2γ̃FC,T=0,1 using D-in-D estimation.  Since I do not have an exclusionary control 
variable for identification purposes, I use the disclosure factor’s variation arising from ε̃, which is 
uncorrelated with ν̃, to identify the indirect effect.  This assumption is no different than asserting the 
appropriateness of an instrumental or an exclusionary control variable; I cannot test it (see 
Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, and Schipper, 2012; Core, Hail, and Verdi, 2014).  This identification 
assumption also implies that I can estimate equations (4) and (5) separately (p. 397, Greene 2002).  I 
therefore estimate the D-in-D versions of equations (4) and (5) separately, and then calculate the 
indirect effect, i.e., the effect of index ownership on stock liquidity through disclosure, by multiplying 
β2 ∗  α1 (i.e., inserting the disclosure equation for the disclosure regressor in the liquidity equation).
41  
Because multiplication introduces non-linearities, I use the delta method (or the linear Taylor 
expansion) to calculate standard errors for this multiplicative term (Sobel 1987; Krull and MacKinnon, 
2001).  I provide the results from this estimation method in Chapter 4.5.   
 
4.2 Univariate Results 
Table 2, Panel B shows that the inclusion firms come from a variety of industries, suggesting 
that there is no specific sectoral factor behind the results.  Table 2, Panel C tabulates descriptive 
univariate changes in the treatment firms compared to changes in the control firms.  Treatment firms 
experience an average increase of 6.54% in index fund shareholdings (significant at the 1% level) 
compared to the control firm change of 0.00%.42  Figure 1 graphs both changes in index fund 
shareholdings and changes in non-indexing institutional investor shareholdings relative to the quarter 
before S&P 500 index inclusion.  The entire exogenous increase in index fund ownership is shown to 
occur in the quarter immediately after index inclusion and remains stable during the two year post-
inclusion observation period. 
I next assess whether the 6.54% mean increase in index fund ownership has a meaningful 
economic interpretation and is large enough to give index fund sponsors control.  Table 5 of Barclay 
                                                 
41
 In this test I use the D-in-D liquidity measures calculated using the average daily bid-ask spread and average 
Amihud illiquidity measure from the pre and post periods.  As a robustness check, I use spreads and Amihud 
illiquidity from just the first two quarters and last two quarters of the pre and post periods and find similar results.  
This test helps show that differences in spreads and Amihud illiquidity persist throughout the entire post period for the 
treatment firm and are not temporary novelty effects. 
42
 This finding is similar in magnitude to recent studies examining the change in institutional holdings around S&P 
500 inclusion.  For example, Table 5 of Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) shows a mean increase in quasi-
indexer institutional investor shareholdings of 8.87% for their S&P 500 treatment firms.  I would expect my results to 
differ from their study because I look at a longer time series and I measure index fund shareholdings directly rather 
than relying on Bushee (1998)’s quasi-indexer investor classification, which is based on trading frequency and 
portfolio diversification, and therefore likely to overstate the magnitude of pure indexers.  Additionally, Wurgler 
(2011) approximates that in 2009, S&P 500 index funds in the U.S. held approximately 8.7% of each firm’s 
outstanding stock in the index (in my sample I find an average of 8.10% for 2009).   
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and Holderness (1989) and Table 3 of Dyck and Zingales (2004) speak to this issue by showing that 
investors assign a premium to control rights even at relatively low levels of ownership (5.0%+).43  
Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2004) also find that managers value the control conferred by state 
antitakeover legislation at about 1% of their own shareholdings in their firms.  These findings support 
the economic significance of the index fund ownership measure. 
By contrast, the net change in the ownership of non-index shareholders for inclusion firms is 
weaker in magnitude, suggesting, at least from a net perspective, that these shareholders’ demand for 
disclosure is unlikely to have changed (Figure 2 graphs changes in index and non-index fund 
shareholdings).  Non-index fund shareholdings are statistically uncorrelated (10% level) to their 
corresponding increase in index fund shareholdings (see correlations in Table 2, Panel D).  Figure 2 
shows that, as expected, index fund ownership depends on index fund AUM. 
Table 2, Panel C also provides univariate mean D-in-D changes in the disclosure measures.  
Upon inclusion into the S&P 500 index, treatment firms increase their disclosure, in both percents and 
levels, for all of the disclosure proxies (relative to control firms).  Treatment firms increase guidance 
disclosures by 14.79%, and issue 26.91% more 8-Ks, 21.56% more supplementary financial 
statements, and 18.47% more press releases relative to control firms (all significant at the 1% level).  
Using levels, treatment firms increase guidance disclosures by 1.97, and issue 4.65 more 8-Ks, 2.26 
more supplementary financial statements, and 2.20 more press releases relative to control firms (all 
significant at the 1% level).  To help put these findings into context, Compustat firms with total assets 
greater than $10M file on average 10.60 8-Ks, 17.02 supplementary financial statement filings, and 
3.71 press releases per two year period over my sample period of 1994-2012.  The volume of 
disclosures I find thus appears to be economically meaningful.  Lastly, treatment firms experience an 
on average reduction in percent bid-ask spreads, Amihud (2002) illiquidity, and percent analyst 
earnings forecast errors by 0.056, 0.014, and 0.0058, respectively, relative to control firms after S&P 
500 index inclusion.  The rest of this study uses multivariate analyses to show why such increases in 
disclosure and decreases in bid-ask spreads, Amihud illiquidity, and forecast errors occur. 
Table 2, Panel C provides univariate statistics on the control variables as well (in the D-in-D 
form).  Almost all of the control variables have means near zero, indicating that neither the treatment 
nor the control firms changed much relative to each other during the pre and post time periods, except 
for index fund ownership.  The only variables with a noticeable difference are analyst following and 
market to book, which increase by about 3 and 0.14 for the treatment firms, respectively.  These 
                                                 
43
 Related to this point, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find evidence of managerial entrenchment when the board 
owns just 5% of equity.  Zingales (1994, 1995) also finds premiums assigned to voting shares at low levels of control. 
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findings are consistent with prior studies relating institutional investors to analyst following (e.g., 
Table 3 of Bhushan 1989; Tables 6 and 7 of O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990) and market to book to index 
inclusion (e.g., Morck and Yang, 2001).  Contemporaneous changes in other firm characteristics such 
as total assets remain close to zero. 
 
4.3 Test of Hypothesis H1 – Index Fund Ownership and Disclosure   
H1 predicts that the index fund ownership stake upon index inclusion is positively associated 
with disclosure.  Table 3 indicates that for a one standard deviation increase in index fund 
shareholdings of the firm, management guidance disclosures increase by 19.35% (significant at the 5% 
level), 8-K filings increase by 18.99% (10% level), supplementary financial statements increase by 
9.49% (1% level), and press release filings increase by 7.51% (1% level).44  These results are 
comparable in magnitude to recent studies such as Shroff et al. (2013), which shows that firms issuing 
new equity increase guidance by 36% and press releases by 17% during the pre-seasoned-equity-
offering period following the 2005 Securities Offering Reform.  Table 3 also shows that all of my 
results hold using disclosure levels.  For a one standard deviation increase in index fund shareholdings, 
management guidance disclosures increase by 1.90 (5% level), 8-K filings increase by 6.57 (5% level), 
supplementary financial statements increase by 4.98 (5% level), and press release filings increase by 
2.23 (5% level).  I find no evidence of an on average change in disclosure due to S&P 500 index 
inclusion (intercept terms are statistically insignificant at the 10% level).  These results are consistent 
with H1, which predicts an increase in disclosure once index funds increase their holdings in a firm.45   
One concern with interpreting the disclosure coefficient on index fund ownership is that the 
non-index fund control coefficient could be correlated with an unobserved determinant of disclosure, 
resulting in a biased index fund coefficient.  However, the index fund coefficient is an unbiased 
estimator even if the residualized non-index fund variable is correlated with the error term, as long as 
the residualized index fund and non-index fund variables are measured without error and uncorrelated 
(a simple calculation can confirm this).  The intuition is that the variance-covariance matrix is diagonal 
and so biases in one estimate are not transmitted to the other estimate.  I find that the correlations 
between the residualized (and unresidualized) index fund and non-index fund variables are statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level (see Table 2, Panel D), and therefore interpret the index fund coefficient 
                                                 
44
 These results are robust to the monotonic transformation of sign(% change) * ln(1 + |% change|).  This 
transformation is employed in Table 9 of Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2004) to attenuate the magnitude of large changes 
while preserving the sign of the change. 
45
 An alternative hypothesis that index firms, in the time leading up to their index inclusion, are populated by large 
investors with a strong preference for disclosure does not appear to be empirically supported.  For example, S&P 
could have specifically targeted such firms for inclusion. 
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without any corrections.  I do not focus on the coefficient of the non-index fund ownership, but only 
the index fund ownership. 
I use prior studies to estimate the capital markets consequences of the additional disclosures 
associated with index fund sponsor ownership.  It has been well-established in the literature that 
management guidance disclosures contribute to the price formation process (see reviews by Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Beyer et al., 2010).  As for 8-Ks, Lerman and Livnat (2010)’s 
Table 3, Panel A shows that 8-K filings categorized as Financial Statements and Exhibits, which 
account for around 75% of 8-K filings from 1994-2007 and encompass my measure of supplementary 
financial statement filings, have absolute excess returns of about 0.17% and abnormal trading volume 
relative to non-disclosure periods.46  I use this 0.17% on average effect to calculate that the average 
absolute excess return for the additional 6.17 supplementary financial statement 8-Ks associated with 
index fund ownership is approximately 1.05%.  My disclosure results are therefore not just statistically 
significant, but economically meaningful. 
The sensitivity of disclosure to index fund ownership also suggests that even my broadest 
measure of disclosure, the overall number of 8-K filings, likely contains a significant voluntary 
component, because it would take substantial operational changes in a company to warrant mandatory 
8-K filings.47  I do not expect index fund ownership to be associated with such operational changes, 
but nonetheless I explicitly check for this by (1) directly computing how many of the total 8-K filings 
result from voluntary disclosures, and (2) looking at compulsory index fund sponsor 13D and 13G 
filings.48  For (1), 96% of the 8-K filings in my setting relate to supplementary financial statements and 
press releases.  For (2), in untabulated tests I find that when a Schedule 13 filing becomes compulsory, 
index fund sponsors commit to a passive investing approach as evidenced by their 13G filings.  These 
results reduce the likelihood that my disclosure measures capture mandatory 8-K filings or operational 
changes resulting from any index fund sponsor intervention.   
The above results are also consistent with evidence in Tables 3 and 4 of Bushee and Noe 
(2000) and Tables 3 and 6 of Boone and White (2014), which show a positive association between 
                                                 
46
 Carter and Soo (1999) also look at market returns for 8-K filings and find that the information contained within 8-
Ks is informative for timely 8-K filings (for a sample of 8-Ks from 1993).  They find evidence that voluntary 
disclosure filings, which include supplementary financial statements, are the timeliest filings. 
47
 Some potential triggers of mandatory 8-K disclosures can be found on the SEC’s website 
(http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm).  These triggers include, for example, change in auditor and change in shell 
company status. 
48
 Mutual fund sponsors must file a Schedule 13 form with the SEC when their aggregate ownership (across all their 
funds) in a firm reaches 5% or more.  The filing of a 13G would suggest that these fund sponsors intend to be passive 
investors, whereas the filing of a 13D would suggest that fund sponsors intend to be actively involved in management.  
Management and shareholders can sue mutual fund sponsors if they file a 13G and try to be active investors, and vice 
versa for 13Ds. 
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“quasi-indexer” institutional investors and disclosure.  Bushee and Noe (2000) view this association as 
a strategic preference for these funds to join firms whose management provides more disclosure; 
Boone and White (2014) argue that “quasi-indexer” investors prefer more disclosure to enhance 
monitoring and reduce trading costs.  The “quasi-indexer” measure, however, includes not just pure 
index funds, but many non-index funds and other large asset managers, many of which strategically 
select their portfolio firms (Bushee and Noe, 2000).  Index funds, on the other hand, have no such 
leeway in strategically selecting their portfolio firms.  Moreover, Bushee and Noe (2000) and Boone 
and White (2014) do not attempt to explicitly test the effect of disclosure on stock liquidity.  As a 
result, the value of my analysis is that I can provide a causal explanation for the observed association 
between institutional ownership (specifically index funds) and disclosure, and, most importantly, I 
explicitly test the effect of disclosure on stock liquidity.  
I also measure an improvement in the firm’s information environment through a reduction in 
analyst forecast errors.  I replicate the D-in-D regression using analyst forecast error instead of 
disclosure as the dependent variable.  In Table 3, I find that for a one standard deviation increase in 
index fund ownership, percent analyst forecast errors decrease by .0045 (5% level), after controlling 
for any change in analyst following.  The similarity between the analyst earnings forecast errors result 
and the disclosure result is consistent with several prior studies.  Waymire (1986) finds that analyst 
earnings forecast accuracy increases after managers provide voluntary disclosures to the capital 
markets, and Baginski and Hassell (1990) and Jennings (1987) find that management disclosures 
trigger analyst earnings forecast revisions.  Hope (2003a, 2003b) show that more transparent firms 
have lower analyst forecast errors.  This phenomenon appears to occur in my setting as well.  
My argument is that the optimal level of disclosure preferred by index funds exceeds that of 
the investors they buy out and management.  As argued in Chapter 2.3, an index fund will not want the 
firm to over-disclose and lose its proprietary advantage.  In untabulated analyses, I check for this 
condition by examining the association between disclosure and firm value after index inclusion.  I fail 
to find a statistically significant association between disclosure and firm value in either direction (this 
insignificant association could occur because of low power). 
Finally, unlike the index fund ownership measure, no control variables consistently explain the 
variation in disclosure across the various specifications.49  This non-result speaks to the accuracy of the 
control firm selection method; as the descriptive statistics for my control variables in Table 2, Panel C 
indicate, treatment firms change very little after S&P 500 inclusion relative to control firms, other than 
the exogenous change in index fund ownership.  In particular, the inclusion effect, i.e., the intercept 
                                                 
49
 The one exception to this is the M&A indicator variable.  Firms typically file an 8-K to announce an M&A deal.  
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term, is insignificant.  This result suggests that it is not inclusion per se, but the level of index fund 
ownership upon inclusion that is driving disclosure changes at the firm.   
 
4.4 Test of Hypothesis H2 – Management Entrenchment 
I measure management entrenchment for the inclusion firm using the Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
entrenchment index (E-index).  I use the most recent E-Index provided after index inclusion, manually 
recreating the measure using RiskMetrics when data are missing.50  The logic behind identifying 
entrenched managers is that they are insulated from shareholders and thus less likely to respond 
favorably to index fund sponsors’ requests for more disclosure, decreasing index fund sponsors’ ability 
to elicit disclosure despite their ownership stake.  
 The above conjecture holds in Table 4 where I recompute my models from Table 3 with an 
interaction term for the change in index fund ownership with a firm’s E-index.  The interaction term 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant across all of the percentage change in disclosure 
tests, except for press releases (-1.232%, -1.944%, and -1.378% for management guidance, 8-K filings, 
and supplementary financial statements).  Similar results obtain for disclosure level changes.  This 
evidence supports H2 and suggests that index fund sponsors are less successful at eliciting disclosure 
from firms when their management is entrenched.  
 
4.5 Test of Hypothesis H3 – Disclosure’s Effect on Stock Liquidity 
Thus far, I’ve argued that index funds prefer more disclosure because they want to increase the 
stock liquidity of the index firms.  As explained in Chapter 4.1.1, I test this conjecture by estimating a 
recursive simultaneous equations model of disclosure and stock liquidity.  To measure stock liquidity, 
I use bid-ask spreads and the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.  To measure disclosure, I create a 
one-dimensional D-in-D disclosure factor using the pre-period to post-period D-in-D percentage 
changes in management guidance, 8-K filings, supplementary financial statements, and press releases.  
Specifically, I create my disclosure factor using a maximum likelihood procedure with varimax rotated 
factors, similar to Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004).  I retain all four percentage change 
                                                 
50
 The more entrenchment governance provisions a firm has, the larger its E-index.  A criticism of this approach is that 
it labels certain governance provisions as unconditionally good or bad for firm performance (Armstrong, Guay, and 
Weber, 2010; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010).  However, the E-index appears appropriate in my setting because I am 
specifically interested in finding a proxy for management’s likelihood to respond to external shareholders, and not for 
summary measures like firm performance.  The change in the E-index from pre to post inclusion is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level for my sample of index inclusion firms. 
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disclosure measures because they all proxy for the same underlying construct.51  Similar to Shroff et 
al. (2013), I use disclosure percentage changes rather than levels because percentages are relative 
measures, and thus I view them as more comparable across companies.   
I first estimate a reduced form D-in-D disclosure model by regressing the disclosure factor on 
index fund ownership and control variables in Table 5, Column 1.  As expected, the coefficient on 
index fund ownership is positive and statistically significant (coefficient of 0.259; 1% level), 
corroborating the findings in Table 3.   
I then estimate the stock liquidity models by regressing the D-in-D bid-ask spread and the D-
in-D Amihud illiquidity measure on the index fund ownership level, the D-in-D disclosure factor, and 
the D-in-D control variables in Table 5, Columns 2 and 3.  This model allows me to compute the effect 
of disclosure on stock liquidity, which I do by multiplying the disclosure factor coefficients from 
Columns 2 and 3 by index fund holdings from Column 1 (-0.106 * 0.259 for spreads and -0.025 * 
0.259 for Amihud illiquidity).  The resulting negative coefficients of -0.027 (significant at the 5% 
level) for spreads and -0.006 (5% level) for Amihud illiquidity show that my disclosure factor is 
associated with increased stock liquidity.52  For a one standard deviation increase in index fund 
ownership, the disclosure effect decreases percent spreads by 0.0435 (5% level) and Amihud 
illiquidity by 0.0104 (5% level).  These results are close in magnitude to recent studies relating the 
quality of a firm’s information environment to bid-ask spreads.  For example, Bushee et al. (2010, 
Table 3) find that percent bid-ask spreads decrease by 0.11 for a one standard deviation increase in 
their abnormal press coverage measure.  Overall, this evidence suggests that index-fund-sponsor-
induced disclosures measurably reduce bid-ask spreads and Amihud illiquidity, as predicted in H3. 
In Table 5, Columns 2 and 3 I also find that index fund ownership directly reduces bid-ask 
spreads (coefficient of -0.031; 5% level) and Amihud illiquidity (-0.012; 5% level), potentially due to 
increased uninformed trading resulting from index fund rebalancing needs.  The ratio of the indirect 
disclosure effect to the direct index fund ownership effect for spreads is 87% (-0.027/-0.031) and for 
Amihud illiquidity is 50% (-0.006/-0.012).  Both effects thus appear to exist in my sample.   
These findings build on prior studies such as Beneish and Whaley (p. 1912, 1996) and Hegde 
and McDermott (p. 414, 2003), which document that a firm’s S&P 500 index inclusion is followed by 
an on average decrease in bid-ask spreads for that firm’s stock.  These studies conjecture, but do not 
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 The associated factor loadings for the D-in-D percentage change in disclosure measures are 0.36 for management 
guidance, 0.83 for 8-K filings, 0.84 for supplementary financial statement filings, and 0.64 for press releases. 
52
 I use the delta method to calculate standard errors for these multiplicative terms (as recommended by Sobel 1987 
and Krull and MacKinnon, 2001).  I follow MacKinnon et al. (2007) and Preacher and Hayes (2008) and do not 
standardize the coefficients because I do not use categorical mediators. 
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directly test, that uninformed index fund trading contributes to this decrease.  In the current study, I not 
only consider the on average index inclusion effect for stock liquidity, but also the liquidity effect of 
index fund uninformed trading, and, most importantly, the liquidity effect of the additional disclosures 
index fund sponsors elicit from index firms.  I find that following index inclusion, these three effects 
are all associated with increased stock liquidity.  My findings thus identify an important mechanism, 
disclosure, that index fund sponsors use to increase stock liquidity, and contribute to the field’s 
understanding of index funds’ preferences and activities. 
 
4.6 S&P 500 Index Deletions 
  A natural extension of index inclusion is to look at index deletions, as index additions and 
deletions always come in pairs.  However, deletions from the S&P 500 index happen mostly because 
index firms get acquired, and not just because they performed poorly.  These acquisitions cause about 
78 percent of index deletions in my sample from 1996-2010, creating a sample selection bias in the 
small number of remaining firms.  The sample selection bias is due to: (1) 78% of deleted firms are 
omitted from the sample because they are no longer publicly traded, and (2) the kind of owners that 
these firms attract when index funds leave could be of a specific type.  Without explicitly modeling the 
preferences of the new owners, it is hard to predict how the disclosure practices of these firms will 
change.  Nonetheless, with these caveats, I assume that the new owners are not systematically of a 
specific nature, which suggests, based on arguments in Chapter 2, that managers will reduce their 
disclosure levels.  I therefore repeat the same set of tests for 82 deleted and closely matched control 
firms (untabulated).  The index and non-index ownership measures are once again residually 
uncorrelated, and the 8-K count, supplementary financial statement, and press release disclosure 
measures drop with the drop in index fund ownership measure (but not guidance); the magnitudes of 
these results are smaller compared to the index inclusion tests.  These results are consistent with the 
reversal of H1. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
Capital markets theory argues that disclosure affects information asymmetry and thus stock 
liquidity, i.e., the sensitivity of stock price to order flow.  Empirically, however, it has been difficult to 
isolate mechanisms through which disclosure affects stock liquidity due to the difficulty of modeling 
management’s and strategic investors’ disclosure preferences (e.g., Joos 2000).  In the current study, I 
sidestep the modeling of strategic disclosure preferences by using an index fund setting.  I argue, based 
on various institutional and empirical findings, that index funds fit the profile of nonstrategic traders 
who, according to theory, have an unambiguous preference for higher stock liquidity, and therefore 
more disclosure, relative to management and other strategic traders.  I use the S&P 500 index fund 
setting to construct an empirical model of voluntary disclosure, and I use this model to measure the 
impact of disclosure on stock liquidity.   
When a firm joins the S&P 500 index, index funds assume an ownership level whose variation 
is determined by index fund assets under management at that time and is thus plausibly exogenous to 
the management’s disclosure choices.  The exogenous ownership level confers a degree of control over 
management.  Accordingly, I find that when a firm joins the S&P 500, its voluntary disclosure 
increases with the level of index fund ownership, and this increase in disclosure is associated with 
increased stock liquidity.  These results imply that voluntary disclosure increases stock liquidity.   
There are several avenues for future research.  First, future research can explore whether index 
funds prefer more disclosure in part to handicap the information advantage of strategically managed 
funds.  Second, increased stock liquidity implies more informative prices, which increase the 
attractiveness of price as a performance measure to motivate management (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993).  Following Edmans (2014), future research can also explore how index-fund-sponsor-induced 
disclosures facilitate monitoring and corporate governance through a more efficient price mechanism.  
This exercise would complement prior studies such as Brav et al. (2008), which show that other large 
owners such as hedge funds govern by using their ownership power and management expertise to 
explicitly intervene in management’s business decisions. 
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S&P 500 Inclusion
(1)
Total Institutional Investor Holdings Before Inclusion 0.093*
(1.85)
Log of Assets 1.700***
(23.41)
Log of Market Capitilization 0.913*
(1.84)
ROA 0.001
(0.01)
Future ∆ ROA 0.000
(1.08)
Capital Expenditures 0.056
(0.10)
Research and Development 0.155
(0.19)
Intangibles 1.600***
(6.09)
Debt -1.70***
(-5.89)
Dividends -0.601***
(-5.45)
Business Segments 1.959***
(2.71)
Bid-Ask Spread -0.094*
(1.70)
Log of Firm Age 0.052**
(2.21)
Market to Book 0.914
(1.01)
Analyst Following 2.451
(1.28)
Observations 87,075
McFadden's Adjusted Pseudo R-squared 0.301
TABLE 1
Propensity Score Logit Regression for S&P 500 Index Inclusion from 1996-2010
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Future ∆ ROA is the firm's average
yearly ROA in years [1, 2] minus the firm's average ROA in years [-2, -1], where year 0 is the firm's
observation year. Bid-Ask Spread is the average daily bid-ask spread during the year preceding
each firm-year observation.  Other variable definitions are in Appendix 4.
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n Mean S.D. 25th % Median 75th % n Mean S.D. 25th % Median 75th % Diff.
Disclosure Variables (in levels)
[-2 years, 0) Mgmt. Guidance 368 2.25 3.97 0.00 0.00 4.00 368 2.01 4.18 0.00 0.00 3.00
[-2 years, 0) All 8-K Issuances 368 12.01 13.70 3.00 8.00 17.00 368 11.51 12.09 3.00 8.00 17.00
[-2 years, 0) Supp. Fin. Stmts. 368 6.46 12.22 1.00 3.00 14.00 368 5.89 10.59 1.00 2.00 11.00
[-2 years, 0) Press Release 368 7.05 8.45 1.00 5.00 13.00 368 6.61 11.33 1.00 4.00 11.00
Firm Characteristics
Inst. Holdings Before Incl. 368 0.45 0.18 0.28 0.41 0.49 368 0.42 0.25 0.22 0.34 0.47
Log of Assets 368 8.66 1.19 7.76 8.54 9.33 368 8.55 1.67 7.47 8.59 9.81
Log of Market Capitalization 368 8.95 0.75 8.50 8.86 9.23 368 8.79 0.86 8.45 8.90 9.10
ROA 368 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.10 368 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.06
Future ∆ ROA 368 0.01 0.14 -0.04 0.00 0.02 368 0.00 0.17 -0.03 0.00 0.03
Capital Expenditures 368 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.07 368 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06
Research and Development 368 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03 368 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02
Intangibles 368 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.29 368 0.15 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.28
Debt 368 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.18 0.34 368 0.22 0.18 0.06 0.19 0.34
Business Segments 368 13.03 8.41 6.00 12.00 18.00 368 13.76 11.00 5.00 12.00 21.00
Bid-Ask Spread 368 0.384 0.450 0.104 0.306 0.692 368 0.417 0.501 0.122 0.320 0.741
Log of Firm Age 368 3.17 0.87 2.25 3.01 3.78 368 3.05 0.89 2.07 2.89 3.54 *
Dividends 368 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 368 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00
Market to Book 368 2.08 2.74 0.76 1.56 3.27 368 1.94 2.45 0.70 1.53 2.97 *
Analyst Following 368 9.83 6.89 4.00 8.00 14.00 368 6.94 8.09 3.00 5.00 11.00 ***
TABLE 2
Panel A: S&P 500 Index Inclusion and Control Group Comparison
S&P 500 Inclusion Group Propensity Score Matched Control Group
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other than Disclosure, Total Inst. Holdings Before Inclusion and Bid-Ask Spread, variables which are expected to change
upon index inclusion, descriptive statistics are averaged over [-2 years, +2 years] relative to inclusion year. The 'Diff.' column tabulates difference in means
from two sample t-tests.   See Chapter 3.1 for sample selection criteria.  Variable definitions are in Appendix 4.
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Freq. Percent Year Freq. Year Freq.
20 5.43% 1994 - 2007 29
6 1.63% 1995 - 2008 31
14 3.80% 1996 17 2009 26
25 6.79% 1997 24 2010 12
4 1.09% 1998 27 2011 -
83 22.55% 1999 33 2012 -
19 5.16% 2000 50 Total 368
17 4.62% 2001 28
31 8.42% 2002 22
Healthcare 27 7.34% 2003 9
Finance 82 22.28% 2004 17
40 10.87% 2005 16
Total 368 100.00% 2006 27
Utilities
Retail
Other
See Chapter 3.1 for sample selection criteria.
Consumer Durables
Manufacturing
Energy
Chemicals and Allied Products
Business Equipment
Communications
Consumer Non Durables
TABLE 2
Panel B: Industry and Year Profile for S&P 500 Index Inclusion Firms from 1996-2010
Inclusion Year Industry Breakdown Year of Index Inclusion
Industry
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D-in-D Variable n Mean S.D. 25th % Median 75th %
Institutional Investor Holdings
[ 1 ] ∆F ∆C in Index Fund Holdings (as a %) 368 6.54*** 1.61 4.95 5.28 8.14
[ 2 ] ∆F ∆C in Non-Index Fund Holdings (as a %) 368 1.47*** 0.53 0.93 1.41 2.02
[ 3 ] ∆F ∆C % Management Guidance 368 14.79*** 9.54 4.11 11.96 27.38
[ 4 ] ∆F ∆C % in All 8-K Filings 368 26.91*** 21.04 11.57 29.68 53.50
[ 5 ] ∆F ∆C % in Supplementary Financial Stmts. 368 21.56*** 25.47 0.00 25.25 61.22
[ 6 ] ∆F ∆C % in Press Releases 368 18.47*** 10.32 6.76 18.20 34.59
[ 7 ] ∆F ∆C Disclosure Factor 368 -0.01 0.54 -0.39 0.12 0.46
Disclosure Variables (as level change)
[ 8 ] ∆F ∆C  Management Guidance 368 1.97*** 2.14 0.00 1.00 3.00
[ 9 ] ∆F ∆C  in All 8-K Filings 368 4.65*** 6.93 -4.00 2.00 9.00
[ 10 ] ∆F ∆C  in Supplementary Financial Stmts. 368 2.26*** 5.45 -3.00 0.00 6.00
[ 11 ] ∆F ∆C  in Press Releases 368 2.20*** 3.06 -1.00 0.00 4.00
Information Asymmetry Variables
[ 12 ] ∆F ∆C  in Bid-Ask Spread 368 -0.0557*** 0.1255 -0.1480 -0.0801 0.0018
[ 13 ] ∆F ∆C  in Amihud Illiquidity 368 -0.0142*** 0.0484 -0.0346 -0.0144 -0.0042
[ 14 ] ∆F ∆C  in Analyst Forecast Errors 368 -0.0058*** 0.0072 -0.0126 -0.0046 0.0033
Governance Variable
[ 15 ] Entrenchment IndexF 368 1.11*** 0.96 0.00 1.00 2.00
Control Variables
[ 16 ] ∆F ∆C in Total Assets 368 0.11 0.62 -0.10 0.16 0.43
[ 17 ] ∆F ∆C  in ROA 368 0.01 0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.02
[ 18 ] ∆F ∆C  in Capital Expenditures 368 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01
[ 19 ] ∆F ∆C  in Research and Development 368 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
[ 20 ] ∆F ∆C  in Intangibles 368 0.02 0.16 -0.05 0.00 0.06
[ 21 ] ∆F ∆C  in Debt 368 0.01 0.15 -0.06 0.00 0.09
[ 22 ] ∆F ∆C  in Business Segments 368 -0.73 4.25 -2.00 0.00 2.50
[ 23 ] ∆F ∆C  in Dividends 368 0.03 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
[ 24 ] ∆F ∆C  in Market to Book 368 0.14** 0.69 -0.46 0.03 0.55
[ 25 ] ∆F ∆C  in Analyst Following 368 2.89*** 5.80 -1.25 1.75 6.00
[ 26 ] ∆F ∆C  in M&A 368 0.11 0.89 0.00 0.00 1.00
[ 27 ] ∆F ∆C  in CEO 368 0.01 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
Blockholder Variables
[ 28 ] ∆F ∆C  in 13G Filings 368 0.23*** 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
[ 29 ] ∆F ∆C  in 13D Filings 368 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
TABLE 2
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for 368 S&P 500 Index Inclusion Treatment Firm and 368 Propensity Matched Control 
Firm
Disclosure Variables (as percent change ┼)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
f = F for index-inclusion (treatment) firm, C for propensity-matched control firm.  
∆F ∆C represents the D-in-D change from the pre (T = 0) to the post period (T = 1).
┼ Percents are computed by taking the number of disclosures in [0, +2 years] post-period divided by the number of
disclosures in [-2 years, 0) pre-period minus one. If there were disclosures made in [0, +2 years] and no disclosures
made in [-2 years, 0), the variable is set to 1; if there were no disclosures in either period, the variable is set to 0.
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Var. # [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] [ 6 ] [ 7 ] [ 8 ] [ 9 ] [ 10 ] [ 11 ] [ 12 ] [ 13 ] [ 14 ] [ 15 ] [ 16 ] [ 17 ] [ 18 ] [ 19 ] [ 20 ] [ 21 ] [ 22 ] [ 23 ] [ 24 ] [ 25 ] [ 26 ] [ 27 ] [ 28 ] [ 29 ]
[ 1 ]
[ 2 ] 0.07
[ 3 ] 0.15 0.03
[ 4 ] 0.11 0.05 0.20
[ 5 ] 0.15 0.03 0.25 0.19
[ 6 ] 0.14 0.00 0.23 0.26 0.11
[ 7 ] 0.21 0.04 0.39 0.91 0.91 0.70
[ 8 ] 0.11 0.02 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.19
[ 9 ] 0.10 0.01 0.32 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.42 0.12
[ 10 ] 0.09 0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.46 -0.01 -0.02
[ 11 ] 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.35 0.01 0.05 -0.06
[ 12 ] -0.14 -0.01 -0.16 -0.12 0.03 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 -0.10 0.06 -0.04
[ 13 ] -0.15 -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 -0.17 -0.15 -0.19 -0.13 0.01 -0.06 0.32
[ 14 ] -0.12 -0.11 0.05 -0.13 0.04 0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.10 0.07
[ 15 ] 0.06 0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03
[ 16 ] 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
[ 17 ] 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04
[ 18 ] -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.10
[ 19 ] 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.14 0.03
[ 20 ] 0.04 0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.14 -0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06
[ 21 ] -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 0.13
[ 22 ] 0.06 0.07 -0.13 0.10 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.15 0.02
[ 23 ] 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02
[ 24 ] 0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 0.13 -0.01
[ 25 ] 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.07 0.05
[ 26 ] 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.10 0.06 -0.03 0.17 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.14
[ 27 ] 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.09 -0.09
[ 28 ] 0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.04 -0.02
[ 29 ] 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.03 -0.04
TABLE 2
Panel D: Pearson Correlations for Treatment and Propensity Matched Control Firm Difference-in-Difference Estimators from 1996-2010
Bolded correlations indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
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∆F ∆C Mgmt. 
Guidance
∆F ∆C 8-K 
Filings
∆F ∆C Supp. Fin. 
Stmts.
∆F ∆C Press 
Releases
∆F ∆C Mgmt. 
Guidance
∆F ∆C 8-K 
Filings
∆F ∆C Supp. Fin. 
Stmts.
∆F ∆C Press 
Releases
∆F ∆C Analyst 
Forecast Errors
D-in-D Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆F ∆C in Index Fund Holdings 12.020** 11.795* 5.897*** 4.677*** 1.182** 4.083** 3.091** 1.385** -0.003**
(2.25) (1.73) (2.76) (2.98) (2.54) (2.50) (2.45) (2.16) (-2.29)
∆F ∆C in Non-Index Fund Holdings 1.153 2.045 4.889 2.213 0.914 0.091 0.064 0.131 0.008
(0.95) (1.01) (1.04) (0.83) (0.12) (1.33) (1.03) (0.35) (0.65)
∆F ∆C in Total Assets 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003
(0.10) (-0.40) (0.75) (1.16) (1.43) (0.34) (-0.40) (-0.23) (-0.11)
∆F ∆C in ROA 220.082 470.069 661.081 189.023 95.099 3.895 10.932 1.443 0.212
(0.45) (0.98) (1.24) (0.99) (0.88) (0.36) (1.11) (0.94) (0.58)
∆F ∆C in Capital Expenditures -985.135 -1,209.511 -1,187.966 -249.552 -122.837 -26.478 -28.476 -11.393 -2.328
(-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.28) (-0.89) (-0.66) (-1.00) (-1.18) (-0.53) (-0.45)
∆F ∆C in Research and Development 845.315 1,457.402 1,389.041 957.015 103.717 2.538 60.701* 50.136 12.981
(0.82) (0.92) (1.10) (1.01) (0.55) (0.07) (1.85) (1.06) (0.78)
∆F ∆C in Intangibles 305.114 248.133 406.102 357.312 355.012 12.895 13.846 10.331 14.011
(0.84) (0.61) (1.25) (0.89) (1.21) (1.39) (1.65) (1.43) (1.00)
∆F ∆C in Debt 416.649 346.100 176.599 113.563 106.12 0.754 5.814 19.231 7.455
(1.01) (0.95) (0.61) (0.85) (1.00) (0.09) (0.77) (0.05) (0.27)
∆F ∆C in Business Segments 4.961 3.766 2.323 5.122 3.566 0.169 0.051 0.341 0.124
(0.50) (0.66) (0.51) (0.25) (0.71) (1.31) (0.44) (0.25) (0.75)
∆F ∆C in Dividends 3.318 6.315 -3.194 1.253 1.001 0.057 -1.686 -0.356 -0.704
(0.25) (0.42) (-0.32) (0.52) (0.95) (0.02) (-0.53) (-0.14) (-0.67)
∆F ∆C in Market to Book 0.584 0.244 0.648 0.326 0.209 -0.000 0.006 0.105 0.612
(0.54) (0.28) (0.93) (0.38) (0.41) (-0.00) (0.36) (0.20) (1.32)
∆F ∆C in Analyst Following 3.143 4.551 3.346 1.086 3.553 0.047 -0.054 0.318 0.099
(1.03) (0.55) (0.50) (0.25) (0.48) (0.25) (-0.32) (0.41) (0.73)
∆F ∆C in M&A Indicator 0.994 4.950* 1.975* 10.204*** 1.114* 2.123** 2.227 1.09*** 0.57
(0.14) (1.71) (1.71) (3.98) (1.81) (2.05) (1.37) (2.82) (1.33)
∆F ∆C in New CEO Indicator 2.341 -8.747 -4.012 6.418 0.935 -0.099 0.590 0.615 0.011
(0.98) (-1.44) (-0.81) (1.35) (1.01) (-0.06) (0.42) (1.16) (0.87)
Intercept 0.044 -2.025 -2.147 0.335 0.263 -0.438 -0.134 0.039 -0.002***
(0.58) (-0.18) (-0.74) (0.53) (0.60) (-0.66) (-0.26) (0.65) (-2.69)
Observations 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.087 0.118 0.091 0.104 0.040 0.042 0.038 0.088
TABLE 3
The Effect of Index Fund Ownership on Disclosure for S&P 500 Index Inclusion Firms Relative to Propensity Matched Control Firms from 1996-2010
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F = index-inclusion (treatment) firm, C = propensity-matched control firm. ∆F ∆C represents the D-in-D change from the pre (T = 0) to the post period
(T = 1).  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered by inclusion year.  Variable definitions are in Appendix 4.
Percentage Change Disclosure Measures Level Change Disclosure Measures
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∆F ∆C Mgmt. 
Guidance
∆F ∆C 8-K 
Filings
∆F ∆C Supp. Fin. 
Stmts.
∆F ∆C Press 
Releases
∆F ∆C Mgmt. 
Guidance
∆F ∆C 8-K 
Filings
∆F ∆C Supp. Fin. 
Stmts.
∆F ∆C Press 
Releases
D-in-D Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆F ∆C in Index Fund Holdings 10.817** 11.165*** 4.991*** 3.744** 1.203** 3.993** 3.204** 1.453**
(2.03) (3.29) (3.53) (2.21) (2.40) (2.55) (2.38) (2.27)
∆F ∆C in Index Fund Holdings * E-IndexF,T=1 -0.183** -0.239** -0.215** -0.335 -0.738*** -0.504* -0.506* -0.499
(-2.31) (-2.43) (-2.08) (-1.40) (-2.91) (-1.95) (-1.91) (-1.18)
Entrenchment Index (E-Index)F,T=1 -0.010 -0.573 -0.580 -0.652 -0.105 0.116 0.110 0.214
(-0.09) (-0.85) (-0.57) (-0.20) (-0.23) (0.17) (0.18) (0.59)
Controls from Table 3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 368 368 368 368 368 368 368 368
Adjusted R-Squared 0.140 0.110 0.132 0.122 0.110 0.048 0.054 0.064
TABLE 4
The Effect of Index Fund Ownership on Disclosure for S&P 500 Index Inclusion Firms Relative to Propensity Matched Control Firms from 1996-2010:
The Case of Entrenched Managers
Percent Change Disclosure Measures Level Change Disclosure Measures
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F = index-inclusion (treatment) firm, C = propensity-matched control firm. ∆F ∆C represents the D-in-D change from the pre (T = 0) to the post
period (T = 1).  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered by inclusion year.  Variable definitions are in Appendix 4.
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Disclosure Factor ∆F ∆C Bid-Ask Spread ∆F ∆C Amihud Illiquidity
D-in-D Variable (1) (2) (2)
∆F ∆C in Index Fund Holdings 0.259*** -0.031** -0.012**
(7.99) (-2.43) (-2.31)
Disclosure Factor -0.106*** -0.025**
(-2.82) (-2.26)
∆F ∆C in Non-Index Fund Holdings 0.009 0.003 0.001
(0.03) (0.10) (0.29)
Intercept 0.000 -0.002*** -0.005**
(0.12) (-2.89) (-2.22)
Controls from Table 3 Y Y Y
Observations 368 368 368
Adjusted R-squared 0.318 0.047 0.058
TABLE 5
Recursive Model of Index Fund Ownership, Disclosure and Bid-Ask Spreads for S&P 500 Index Inclusion Firms Relative to 
Propensity Matched Control Firms from 1996-2010
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. F = index-inclusion (treatment) firm, C = propensity-matched control firm. ∆F ∆C represents
the D-in-D change from the pre (T = 0) to the post period (T = 1). T-statistics are in parentheses. The recursive model
regression specification is described in Chapter 4.1.1 and Equations (4) and (5). I first estimate a reduced form D-in-D
disclosure model by regressing the disclosure factor on index fund ownership and control variables in Column 1. I then
estimate the bid-ask spread and Amihud illiquidity models by regressing the D-in-D bid-ask spread measure and the D-in-D
Amihud illiquidity measure on the index fund ownership level, the D-in-D disclosure factor, and the D-in-D control variables in
Columns 2 and 3, respectively. I compute the effect of disclosure on the bid-ask spreads and the Amihud illiquidity measures
by multiplying the disclosure factor coefficient from Columns 2 and 3, respectively, by index fund holdings from Column 1. I
describe the results in Chapter 4.5. As discussed in Chapter 4.1.1., I create the one-dimensional D-in-D disclosure factor using
the pre-period to post-period D-in-D percentage changes in management guidance, 8-K filings, supplementary financial
statements, and press releases (described in Table 2, Panel C); I use a maximum likelihood procedure with varimax rotated
factors, similar to Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004). The associated factor loadings for the D-in-D percentage change in
disclosure measures are 0.36 for management guidance, 0.83 for 8-K filings, 0.84 for supplementary financial statement filings,
and 0.64 for press releases.  Standard errors are clustered by inclusion year.  Variable definitions are in Appendix 4.
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∆F∆C in Index Fund Institutional Holdings
(as a % of shares outstanding)
∆F∆C in Non-Index Fund Institutional Holdings
(as a % of shares outstanding)
FIGURE 1
Change in Institutional Holdings for Treatment Firms Relative to Propensity Matched Control Firms after S&P 500 Inclusion from 1996-2010
Difference in difference level values are graphed. The X-axis represents the quarter relative to treatment firm S&P 500 index inclusion (event time). The Y-axis
represents the average percentage of share ownership for treatment firms relative to control firms for the given quarter, net of the percentage of share ownership for
treatment firms relative to control firms in the quarter prior to treatment firm index inclusion. F = index-inclusion (treatment) firm, C = propensity-matched control
firm.  ∆F ∆C represents the D-in-D change from the pre (T = 0) to the post period (T = 1). 
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FIGURE 2
Change in Institutional Investor Holdings after S&P 500 Inclusion Relative to Propensity Matched Control Firms as a Percent of Outstanding Shares from 1996-2010
Average difference-in-difference variables are graphed by inclusion year.
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Appendix 1 
 
Industry Practice and Liquidity 
 
BlackRock’s iShares ETF Mechanism 
 
 
(http://us.ishares.com/content/en_us/repository/resource/innovative_mechanism.pdf) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Industry Practice and Disclosure 
 
BlackRock’s Global Corporate Governance and Engagement Principles 
 
“Where company reporting and disclosure is inadequate or the approach taken is inconsistent with our 
view of what is in the best interests of shareholders, we will engage with the company and/or use our 
vote to encourage better practice.  In making voting decisions, we take into account research from 
external proxy advisors, other internal and external research and academic articles, information 
published by the company or provided through engagement and the views of our equity portfolio 
managers.” 
 
“BlackRock believes that shareholders have a right to timely and detailed information on the financial 
performance and situation of the companies in which they invest.  In addition, companies should also 
publish information on the governance structures in place and the rights of shareholders to influence 
these.  The reporting and disclosure provided by companies forms the basis on which shareholders can 
assess the extent to which the economic interests of shareholders have been protected and enhanced 
and the quality of the board’s oversight of management.  BlackRock considers as fundamental, 
shareholders’ rights to vote, including on changes to governance mechanisms, to submit proposals to 
the shareholders’ meeting and to call special meetings of shareholders.” 
 
(http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-
1engprinciples-global-122011.pdf) 
 
BlackRock’s 2012 engagements 
 
 
(http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/about-us/responsible-investment/engagement-and-proxy-
voting) 
 
Glass Lewis “Proxy Talks” 
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“From time to time, Glass Lewis will host ‘Proxy Talk’ conference calls to discuss a meeting, proposal 
or issue in depth.  Glass Lewis’ clients are able to listen to the call and submit questions to the 
speakers, with representatives from Glass Lewis’ research team serving as moderators.  Proxy Talks 
are held prior to the publishing of our research in order to glean additional information that we (and 
our clients) consider as part of our analysis.  Typically calls are held to provide the participants (e.g., 
company representatives, dissidents, shareholder proposal proponents) an open forum to provide 
further color on specific issues.  We believe this is an effective way for companies to reach our client 
base directly, empowering our clients and fostering improved disclosure of the relevant facts.” 
 
(http://www.glasslewis.com/for-issuers/glass-lewis-corporate-engagement-policy/) 
 
Glass Lewis on Disclosure 
 
“As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly 
available disclosures (e.g. the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released 
following the date of the company’s last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most 
current Proxy Paper.  Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited 
to, the following: 
 At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related 
party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities.  
 Any revisions made to the company’s articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance 
documents. 
 Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, 
business practices or special reports. 
 Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company’s compensation program.” 
 
(http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2012/02/Guidelines_UnitedStates_2013_Abridged1.pdf) 
 
“When rendering advice on audit committee members and the appointment of auditors, Glass Lewis 
pays careful attention to the transparency and history of financial statements.” 
 
(http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/proxy-paper/) 
 
“Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is 
critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which the pay is keeping pace with company 
performance.  When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses 
the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation.  We recognize performance 
metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may 
include items such as total shareholder return, earnings per share growth, return on equity, returns on 
assets and revenue growth.  However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific 
performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to 
better corporate performance.” 
 
(http://www.glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2012/02/Guidelines_UnitedStates_2013_Abridged1.pdf) 
 
Disclosure initiatives in the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 2013 Proxy Season Report 
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ISS’s 2013 U.S. Proxy Season Review, a document that summarizes important management and 
shareholder proposals from January to June of 2013, lists 42 disclosure related initiatives.  A sampling 
of these include: executive pay clawback policies, executive compensation policies, more detailed 
financial statements for overseas operations, a breakdown of political contributions, a breakdown of 
lobbying payments, and additional sustainability and environmental disclosures. 
 
(http://www.issgovernance.com/2013postseasonreportus) 
 
Vanguard’s views on corporate governance website states: 
 
“We have found, through hundreds of meetings and discussions annually, that we can often 
accomplish more through dialogue than through the ballot.” 
 
“…companies' required disclosures of their pay practices are more useful and create more 
accountability if they focus as much on ‘why’ as they do on ‘how much’.” 
 
(https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/corporate-governance/) 
 
Fidelity Group’s Corporate Governance Guidelines 
 
“…the specific proxy voting policies that are summarized below to maximize the value of investments 
in its clients' accounts, which it believes will be furthered through (1) accountability of a company's 
management and directors to its shareholders, (2) alignment of the interests of management with those 
of shareholders (including through compensation, benefit and equity ownership programs), and (3) 
increased disclosure of a company's business and operations.” 
 
(http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/governance.shtml) 
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Appendix 3 
 
Control Variables 
 
Construct Description and Proxy Source 
Size and Complexityf,T Larger firms and firms with more complex operations 
may inherently have more information to disclose.  I 
control for this effect using total assets, the number of 
business and geographical segments, and the amount of 
intangibles.
1
 
Compustat 
Profitabilityf,T Prior research documents a relationship between 
profitability and disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Miller 2002).  I measure profitability using net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets 
(ROA). 
Compustat 
Growthf,T A firm may want to disclose its growth options or its 
current state of growth, a factor I measure using market 
to book ratio. 
Compustat, CRSP 
Analystsf,T Prior research documents that analysts prefer firms with 
better disclosure practices.  Hence, changes in analyst 
following can help control for a firm’s potentially 
unobservable disclosure practices.  I measure change in 
analyst following using the average number of 
outstanding EPS forecasts from the pre to post period. 
I/B/E/S 
Operationsf,T More active firms are likely to disclose information 
related to their activities.  I therefore measure capital 
expenditures, research and development costs, debt, an 
indicator for acquisitions, and an indicator for CEO 
changes. 
Compustat, SDC, 
Execucomp 
Dividendsf,T Prior research documents that some institutional investors 
prefer dividend paying firms.  Dividends may also relate 
to a change in a firm’s operations.  I employ an indicator 
equal to 1 if a firm pays a dividend, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Systematic Changesf,T Managers could systematically change their firm’s 
disclosure policy for reasons related to S&P 500 
inclusion alone.  This inclusion effect forms the intercept 
term in my regressions. 
N/A 
Idiosyncratic Changesf,T Any idiosyncratic changes in disclosure form the error 
terms in my regressions. 
N/A 
f = F for index-inclusion (treatment) firm; C for propensity-matched control firm. 
T = 0 for two year pre-period ending day before inclusion date; 1 for two year post-period beginning on inclusion 
date. 
Control variables calculated as difference-in-difference: (𝑋𝑖𝐹,𝑇=1 − 𝑋𝑖𝐹,𝑇=0) − (𝑋𝑖𝐶,𝑇=1 − 𝑋𝑖𝐶,𝑇=0). 
 
                                                 
1
 Other than total assets, balance sheet and income statement variables noted here are scaled by total assets. 
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Variable Definition Source
Index Fund Holdingsf,T
Percentage of outstanding shares held by index funds measured on the first calendar quarter end after the included 
firm's index inclusion. Thomson Mutual Fund Database
Non-Index Fund Holdingsf,T
Percentage of outstanding shares held by non-index fund institutional shareholders averaged over observation period T 
(measured at calendar quarter end dates). Thomson 13F Database
Management Guidancef,T Number of quarters in observation period T for which management issued EPS guidance. I/B/E/S
8-K Filingsf,T Total number of 8-K filings during observation period T. WRDS SEC Analytics Suite
Suppl. Financial Statementsf,T
8-K filings categorized as financial statements and exhibits and/or results of operations and financial condition during 
observation period T. WRDS SEC Analytics Suite
Press Releasesf,T Press release 8-K filings during observation period T. WRDS SEC Analytics Suite
Disclosure Factorf,T
This variable is a summary disclosure factor based on the pre-period to post-period (T = 0 to T = 1) D-in-D percentage 
change in management guidance, 8-K filings, supplementary financial statements, and press releases.  I use a 
maximum likelihood procedure with varimax rotated factors (see Chapter 4.5 for factor weightings).
I/B/E/S, WRDS SEC Analytics 
Suite
Bid-Ask Spreadf,T See Chapter 3.4 for the bid-ask spread D-in-D computation procedure. TAQ
Amihud Illiquidityf,T See Chapter 3.4 for the Amihud illiquidity D-in-D computation procedure. CRSP
Analyst Forecast Errorf,T See Chapter 3.4 for the analyst forecast error D-in-D computation procedure. I/B/E/S
E-Indexf,T Manager entrenchment index in observation period T = 1. Bebchuk et al. (2009); RiskMetrics
Total Assetsf,T Log of total assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
ROAf,T Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
Capital Expendituresf,T Capital expenditures divided by total assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
Research and Developmentf,T Research and development expense divided by total assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
Intangiblesf,T Intangible assets divided by total assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
Debtf,T (Current debt plus long term debt) divided by total assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
Business Segmentsf,T Number of business segments plus geographic segments averaged over observation period T. Compustat
Dividendsf,T 1 if firm paid a dividend in observation period T, 0 otherwise. Compustat
Market to Bookf,T Market value divided by book value of assets averaged over observation period T. Compustat
M&A Indicatorf,T 1 if firm made an acquisition during the observation period, 0 otherwise. SDC Platinum
New CEO Indicatorf,T 1 if firm replaced CEO during the observation period, 0 otherwise. Execucomp
Analyst Followingf,T Number of analysts with outstanding EPS forecasts averaged over observation period T. I/B/E/S
13G Filingsf,T Passive investor 13G blockholder filings in observation period T. WRDS SEC Analytics Suite
13D Filingsf,T Active investor 13D blockholder filings in observation period T. WRDS SEC Analytics Suite
APPENDIX 4
Variable Definitions for S&P 500 Inclusion (Treatment) and Propensity Matched Control Firms
This Appendix describes each variable used in this study and its source.  For my D-in-D tests I compute each variable using the following D-in-D procedure:
X = variable; f = F for index-inclusion (treatment) firm, C for propensity-matched control firm;
T = 0 for the two year pre-period ending the day before the inclusion date, 1 for the two year post-period beginning on the inclusion date.
Institutional Investor Holdings Measures
Stock Liquidity and Information Asymmetry Measures
Governance Measure
Control Variables (calculated using annual data)
Disclosure Measures
XiF,T=1 − XiF,T=0 − XiC,T=1 − XiC,T=0
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